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Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays at the intersection of macroeconomics and cor­
porate finance. The broad theme that links the three chapters is the study of how 
endogenous borrowing constraints that affect firms and financial intermediaries influ­
ence aggregate investment.
In Chapter I, the existing theoretical framework studying how financial constraints 
in firms may make economies more sensitive to shocks (the ‘financial accelerator’) is 
extended to take account of firms’ precautionary investment behaviour when they 
anticipate future liquidity constraints. This behaviour is at the source of a powerful 
amplification mechanism of shocks, and is also able to account for the documented 
dynamics of the composition of investment across the business cycle: in particular 
how risky, illiquid investment as a share of total investment fluctuates both at the 
firm and at the aggregate level.
Chapter II studies how the public supply of liquidity affects the private creation 
of liquidity by firms (inside liquidity), and how this interacts with firms’ demand 
for liquidity to influence investment and capital accumulation. The conditions under 
which government debt may boost or reduce private investment are shown to depend 
on three channels: (1 ) a crowding-in effect, by enhancing aggregate liquidity, (2 ) a 
crowding-out effect, by reducing the collateral value of entrepreneurial assets and 
(3) a redistributive effect. The model also shows how a production economy with 
endogenous liquidity can help resolve some important asset pricing puzzles. Finally, 
the business cycle properties of the model are studied.
Chapter III shows how recent developments in financial markets may have made 
economies less vulnerable to banking crises as they widen access to liquidity, but by 
relaxing financial constraints facing financial intermediaries, they imply that, should 
a crisis occur, its impact could be more severe than previously. These effects may be 
reinforced by greater macroeconomic stability. Finally, financial intermediaries are 
shown to under-insure and over-borrow from a constrained-efficient viewpoint.
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Chapter 1 
Credit Constraints, Firms’ 
Precautionary Investment, and the 
Business Cycle
1.1 Introduction
There is a large body of research on the role of financial frictions in amplifying 
business cycles and monetary policy shocks. Most of this work is focused on studying 
how firms’ investment capacity is affected by tighter borrowing constraints in recessions 
or following a tightening of monetary policy, either directly through a balance sheet 
channel (Bemanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bemanke, Gertler 
and Gilchrist (1999)) or indirectly through a decreased supply of intermediated finance 
(Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Bolton and Freixas (2003), Van den Heuvel (2007)). In 
either case, all of these theories describe how firms are constrained in the amount they 
can invest following a shock.
There has been little focus in the literature however on an amplification and propa­
gation mechanism that studies how changes in the likelihood of being credit constrained
13
in the future may be affecting firms’ willingness to invest and firms’ preference for the 
type of investment they carry out. In short, firms that anticipate being credit constrained 
in the future may wish to retain more liquid balance sheets by investing less or investing 
differently.
Empirical evidence suggests indeed that firms’ precautionary behaviour in antici­
pation of future expected financial constraints is a key determinant of their financial 
and investment decisions. Recent surveys by Graham and Harvey (2001) and Bancel 
and Mittoo (2002) find that CFOs consider financial flexibility (having enough inter­
nal funds to avoid having to fore-go positive Net Present Value projects in the future) 
to be the primary determinant of their policy decisions. Almeida, Campello and Weis- 
bach (2004) report that the expectation of future financing problems significantly affects 
firms’ investment policies, and Caggesse and Cunat (2007) find that it significantly af­
fects hiring decisions.
The relevance of this approach is further enhanced by two observations. On the 
one hand, despite the fact that a small fraction of agents are observed to be financially 
constrained at any given point in time, a much larger fraction may anticipate the possi­
bility of being constrained in the future. The importance of this distinction between the 
effect of the anticipation of constraints and the contemporaneous effect of constraints 
has already been pointed out in studies of the buffer stock behaviour of consumers. 
On the other hand, the subset of firms that suffer most from financial constraints and 
hence for which these considerations are relevant (small and privately-owned firms) is 
a very sizeable portion of economic activity, and in the US accounts for about one half 
of private-sector GDP and employment. 1
As is suggested in the empirical evidence mentioned above, firms may insulate 
themselves from potential future credit rationing by adjusting their financial policies,
'Data from the U.S. Small Business Administration Report 2003 show that non-farm businesses with 
less than 500 employees account for about half o f  private-sector GDP, employ more than half o f  private- 
sector labour, and over 1992-2002 generated between 60-80% o f  net new jobs annually.
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their hiring decisions, their cash holdings, or their investment strategies. This paper 
focuses on the effects on investment decisions.2 A number of questions arise. Can a 
mechanism capturing this precautionary element in firms’ behaviour have significant 
effects on aggregate investment and output dynamics? Can it account for the behaviour 
of the composition of real investment across the business cycle, which current mod­
els studying the macroeconomic implications of agency costs cannot account for? Are 
frictions preventing optimal risk and liquidity management by firms a powerful ampli­
fication mechanism of macroeconomic shocks?
These questions are dealt with by analyzing a dynamic stochastic general equilib­
rium model of a production economy subject to aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty. 
In the model, entrepreneurial firms in the investment good-producing sector have access 
to a highly profitable technology that is subject to liquidity risk. They also have access 
to safe but low-retum alternative investment opportunity. Their wealth is limited, and 
they enter into state contingent contracts with financial intermediaries, which resemble 
a combination of standard loans and credit lines.3 Entrepreneurs are subject to limited 
commitment and collateral constraints, and this will limit the extent to which financial 
intermediaries can spread the idiosyncratic risk faced by entrepreneurs.
In this paper I first describe theoretically the mechanism for the proposed precau­
tionary channel of amplification of macroeconomic shocks. Entrepreneurs need to col­
lateralize their borrowing using their fixed capital. If a negative aggregate productivity 
shock hits the economy, fire sales of capital will cause valuations to drop, and this de­
creases the pledgeability of entrepreneurial returns. Given the persistence of aggregate
2 With regards to financial policies, I take the approach that firms have a limited ability to use their 
capital structure to gain financial flexibility due to financial constraints. For example, a large fraction 
o f  firms do not have the flexibility to switch between debt and equity, or the ability to issue commercial 
paper. In any case, in the model firms borrow using state contingent contracts subject to collateral con­
straints, and decide optimally the extent to which they want to hedge using that contract or by adjusting 
their investment decisions.
3 Small and medium sized enterprises rely overwhelmingly on financial intermediaries rather than 
financial markets for their financing and risk management activities (Cantillo and Wright (2000), Faulk- 
ender (2003), Petersen and Rajan (1994)) and do so mostly using loan commitment facilities (Kashyap et 
al. (2002) document that 70% o f  bank lending to U.S. small firms is done on a loan commitment basis).
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shocks, firms anticipate being less able to rely on asset liquidations or spot borrowing to 
deal with any possible future idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, and shift the composition 
of their investment towards less volatile and more liquid, but less profitable, activities. 
This amplifies the effect of the initial shock.
Secondly, I show in a calibrated model that this mechanism is quantitatively sig­
nificant. Furthermore, I find that the amplification mechanism has two features which 
match observed business cycle regularities. On the one hand, it is highly asymmetric, 
delivering short and sharp recessions, and prolonged moderate boom periods. The ex­
tent to which the amplification mechanism is symmetric or not depends on how positive 
and negative technology shocks affect the trade-off between current and future marginal 
rates of return on different types of investment differently, and on the extent to which 
credit constraints are more likely in recessions. On the other, this channel requires rel­
atively smaller negative technology shocks to generate recessions than it does positive 
shocks to generate booms. In the extreme, shocks to the volatility of the stochastic 
productivity process can generate downturns without any change to fundamental tech­
nology parameters.
The third main result is that this model is able to account for the business cycle 
patterns of aggregate and firm-level composition of investment. This is in line with 
evidence presented in a number of recent empirical papers. Aghion, et al. (2007) find 
using a firm-level data-set that while the share of R&D investment over total investment 
is countercyclical for firms that do not face credit constraints, it becomes pro-cyclical 
for credit constrained firms. Furthermore, this is only observed in downturns, when 
the share of R&D for these firms falls drastically. Almeida, Campello and Weisbach 
(2004) find on the other hand that financially constrained firms’ cash flow sensitivity 
of cash increases significantly in recessions, while it is unchanged for unconstrained 
firms. Aghion, et al. (2005) give evidence using data on the aggregate composition of 
investment of a panel of countries that the share of structural (long-term) investment
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over total investment decreases following shocks that can be expected to make firms 
more likely to be credit constrained in the near future, and also document that this effect 
is stronger for less financially developed economies. They find, importantly, that the 
effect of financial development on the strength of the financial accelerator does not act 
through a mechanism that alters the amount of investment, but rather the composition, 
something which is at odds with the main prediction in existing macro models of credit 
frictions, in which the effects of the expectations of future potential financial constraints 
are ignored.
These observations are at odds with the existing models of macroeconomic implica­
tions of agency costs in which expectations of future constraints do not affect firms’ cur­
rent actions. In my model, however, a worsening of expected credit conditions causes 
the composition of investment to shift to safer but lower return technologies (contrary 
to the Schumpeterian idea of ’'cleansing” recessions). Also, composition shifts to ac­
tivities with a higher degree of asset tangibility, and towards activities that use more 
liquid collateral and collateral whose value is less pro-cyclical. Absent alternative safer 
investment technologies, firms increase their investment in liquid, marketable securities 
and cash.
Relationship with the Literature
This paper is closely related to the strand of literature studying the macroeconomic 
implications of endogenous borrowing constraints for firms, such as Bemanke and 
Gertler (1989), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bemanke, 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), Bolton and Freixas (2003), Krishnamurthy (2003), Rampini 
(2004) and Van den Heuvel (2007). The majority of the papers in this literature does not 
study issues of risk-sharing and insurance, and instead focus mainly on how credit fric­
tions affect the ability of firms to invest.4 Krishnamurthy (2003) and Rampini (2004) are
4 Stochastic models in this literature abstract from issues o f  risk management by making certain mod­
elling choices that make risk irrelevant for entrepreneurs, such as assuming risk neutrality, linear produc­
tion technologies, or permanently binding credit constraints.
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an exception however. Krishnamurthy (2003) studies how introducing state-contingent 
claims eliminates the Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) mechanism, and shows that an ag­
gregate constraint on the capacity of the economy to provide such insurance against 
aggregate shocks reinstates the mechanism, only that the constraint is on the side of the 
suppliers of finance. I extend that analysis along three key dimensions. Firstly, Krish­
namurthy (2003) does not study the ex-ante effects of limited insurance capacity on the 
optimal investment choice of firms, which is the key element of the new mechanism I 
introduce in this paper. Secondly, I extend the model to a fully dynamic setup. Finally, 
I integrate the analysis in a fully general equilibrium model to be able to assess quan­
titatively the importance of this channel. A paper closely related in spirit is Rampini 
(2004), in which a model is introduced that delivers pro-cyclical entrepreneurial ac­
tivity and amplification of technology shocks. The main difference with my paper is 
that his mechanism relies on entrepreneurs’ risk aversion as the only motive for risk 
management, while in my setup demand for insurance is production-related.
There is another strand of literature that studies the macroeconomic impact of unin- 
surable idiosyncratic labour-income risk (Huggett (1993), Aiyagari (1994), Krusell and 
Smith (1998)) or uninsurable investment risk (Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), Angele- 
tos and Calvet (2005,2006), Covas (2006)) in the neoclassical growth model, to analyze 
issues related to capital accumulation, equilibrium real interest rates and output growth 
rates. They do not study however if and how market incompleteness varies across the 
cycle, and how this endogeneity of the risk-sharing opportunities affects cyclical fluc­
tuations.
Regarding the corporate finance literature, a number of theoretical papers have iden­
tified the different sources of firms’ insurance demand. One such motive is that if firms 
face costs of raising external finance, or indeed the prospect of being credit rationed, 
they may find it optimal to hedge against low cash-flow realizations to avoid having to 
fore-go positive NPV projects, a motive studied formally in Froot, Scharfstein and Stein
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(1993). Another important source is the risk-aversion of entrepreneurs who, for incen­
tive reasons, have most of their personal wealth invested in the venture they manage, 
and who also hold a controlling stake in that venture (Stulz (1984)).5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 studies in detail the 
problem faced by entrepreneurial agents and financial intermediaries in a partial equi­
librium set-up. Section 1.3 embeds this analysis in a fully general equilibrium dynamic 
stochastic model. The steady state of the model, and the calibration, are discussed in 
section 1.4. Section 1.5 presents the main results of the model. Section 1.6 presents 
empirical evidence. Finally, section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Partial Equilibrium Analysis of Entrepreneurs and 
Financial Intermediaries
In this section I focus on the partial equilibrium analysis of entrepreneurs and finan­
cial intermediaries, and in the following section I embed this partial equilibrium setup 
in a general equilibrium framework. For clarity, I begin here by making a brief descrip­
tion of the whole economy in which the entrepreneurial and intermediary sectors will 
be embedded. An explanatory chart to aid in understanding the interrelationships in the 
model economy is in figure (1 .1).
Consider an infinite horizon, discrete-time economy, populated by four types o f  
agents: households (measure 1 — 77), entrepreneurs (measure 77), firms (measure 1) and 
banks (measure 1), where within each type there is a continuum of agents. There are 
three types o f goods: consumption goods, investment goods, and entrepreneurial capi­
tal ("capital" from now on). Entrepreneurs produce the investment good using capital,
5Other motives have also been pointed out in the literature, such as hedging as a way to avoid non­
linear costs o f  financial distress (Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), Smith and Stulz (1985)), to resolve 
conflicts o f  interest between bond-holders and equity-holders, or between managers and providers o f  
finance, and hedging to avoid tax non-linearities (Smith and Stulz (1985)).
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and are subject to agency problems when seeking external finance. They are financed 
using their own net worth and external funds from households through financial inter­
mediaries. Firms produce the consumption good using labour (from households and 
entrepreneurs) and the investment good, and are not subject to any agency problems. 
The model uses consumption goods as the numeraire.
Hous eholds Rental of Stock 
of Investment 
Goods
LaborSavings
New
Investment
Goods
FirmsFinancial
Intermediaries Produce consumption 
goods using 
investm ent goods
Savings
LaborEntrepreneurs 
Produce investm ent 
goods using 
entrepreneurial capital
Figure 1.1: The Economy - Agents and their Economic Relationships
Now I turn to analyze the entrepreneurs’ and intermediaries’ problem in detail.
1.2.1 Entrepreneurs
There are overlapping-generations of two-period lived entrepreneurs, and within 
each generation there is a continuum of them. Entrepreneurs are risk-neutral and maxi­
mize expected utility of consumption in their final period.
An entrepreneur alive in period t (which could either be a newborn or a second- 
period entrepreneur) can invest in two different technologies, both of which produce 
capital (to be used by final consumption good producing firms) using consumption
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goods as the sole input. The difference between both technologies is that one pro­
duces safe returns, is less productive, and uses tangible (collateralizable) capital, while 
the other is more productive, risky and uses intangible capital. One could think of the 
first technology as expanding an existing production plant, while the second technol­
ogy could be thought of as investment in marketing in order to start selling products 
in a new regional market or as R&D investment. Both production processes take place 
within the period, and hence are not subject to aggregate uncertainty, which is resolved 
at the beginning of the period.
In particular, the first technology produces a return asiajt in terms of capital goods, 
where as > 0 , to be sold at price qt, and requires investing a total amount l / 2 cz^t. 
The second technology produces an expected return of E(ar)irj  capital goods plus 
eirj  consumption goods, and requires investing a total amount l/2 d i2r t. I assume that 
E(ar) > as, and that ar can take two values, > 0 or zero with equal probability.
An entrepreneur bom in period t will make a first investment choice at the beginning 
of t and a second one at the beginning of period t +  1. It is convenient to study the 
optimal investment problem backwards. In period t + 1 an entrepreneur with wealth 
n t+1 solves the following optimization problem:
where is,t+i is the investment in the safe technology, ir,t+i is the investment in the 
risky technology, n t + 1 is the wealth with which an entrepreneur enters period t + 1 , and 
bt + 1 is the position in safe bonds (borrowing if bt + 1 > 0, lending if bt + 1 < 0). Absent 
any borrowing constraints, optimal investment and borrowing positions are:
max qt+ia3i3it+i + [qt+iE(ar) +  e]ir,t+1 , ( 1.1)
( 1.2)
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Qt+i&s (1.3)S^,t + 1
C
^r,t+ 1
te+l-^(ar) + (1.4)
d
1 / 2 t a W !  +  1 / 2 te +1^ K )  +  e]2 _
c a
(1.5)
One of our objects of interest is the study of the cyclical behaviour of risky, produc­
tive investment as a share of safe investment, which in this case is given by:
i r , t + 1 _  [Qt+iE(ar) +  e] c
This ratio turns out to be countercyclical, or, in other words, in a world without 
credit constraints the share of R&D and other risky activities increases in downturns. In 
good times, short run returns are high (q is high, which is the only element driving the 
immediate returns), and relatively more so than long-run returns given that the mean- 
reverting process driving qt is dampened by the constant term e, making returns to the 
risky activity fluctuate less across the business cycle.
Consumption by entrepreneurs in their second period in the unconstrained case is:
In expression (1.7), superscript i  indicates the outcome of the risky project. Note in 
this expression that consumption is linear in beginning-of-period net worth.
When we consider credit frictions this result may no longer hold. In particular, 
assume that an entrepreneur is prevented from borrowing more a multiple /i of its short 
run profits in the safe activity. This captures the extent to which the entrepreneur can
Qt+i&s d
( 1.6)
^s,t+ 1
[qt+iE{ar) +  e] 
d
(1.7)
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borrow using the returns to the short run activity as collateral. Credit constraints will 
bind as long as first best borrowing is above the pledgeable amount, or:
n /r ,(9 m °» )2 , , , J g t+ iE (a r) +  e}2 _  _ (gt+ia s)2
1 / Z ------------------ h L / 4 ------------- ------------------ 7 lt+ i >  ( I -----------------c a c
This is more likely to happen when q is low, ie. in downturns. Intuitively, the 
combination of low short run profits and a shift of the opportunity cost trade-off towards 
the long-run risky activity being relatively more attractive than the short run activity 
in recessions than in booms means that borrowing constraints are more likely to bind 
in negative aggregate states. This means that the long-run risky activity may be less 
countercyclical than in the unconstrained scenario, or indeed procyclical. With binding 
borrowing constraints in period t +  1 , optimal investment and borrowing positions in 
that period are:
_  Q t+ ids (1 — m(1 +  r t+ 1 — ^t+i))^s,t+ 1 x
C X t + 1
_  [Qt+iE{ar) +  e]
lr ,t+ 1 — \  AXt+id
^ t+ i =  fJ,Q t+ i^s'is,t+ i-
Combining expressions (1.2), (1.8) and (1.9), we get a consumption function in 
the constrained case which is a nonlinear (concave) function of beginning-of-period 
net worth. Now let’s focus on the first period’s decision. The problem solved by an 
entrepreneur at the beginning of his lifetime is:
(1.8)
(1.9)
(1.10)
max Et(ct+1{nt+1)) 
S.t.
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l/2 c i2st +  1/2 di2rt = wt +  bt
bt ^  (J'QtQ's'i's,t
n\+1 = qtasiSjt +  (qtalr +  e) ir>t -  (1 +  rt)bt
The potential for binding constraints in some states introduces an important non- 
linearity in the relationship between the net worth entrepreneurs transfer into their sec­
ond period and returns from investment in that period. This nonlinearity introduces a 
motive for smoothing this net worth, and to the extent that financial frictions may limit 
the ability to share entrepreneurial risk, this hedging incentive may affect first-period 
investment decisions. This is the essence of the precautionary investment motive de­
scribed in the introduction.
1.2.2 Financial Intermediaries
Financial intermediaries in this model channel savings received from households 
and lend to entrepreneurs. At the beginning of every period, all of the households’ 
savings are deposited in financial intermediaries, which commit to purchase investment 
goods from entrepreneurs and return it to households by the end of the period. Financial 
intermediaries use that liquidity to provide loans to entrepreneurs.
1.3 General Equilibrium
In this section, I embed the entrepreneurial and financial intermediation sectors in a 
general equilibrium framework. I will start by explaining the choices faced by house­
holds and firms, and then discuss how the entrepreneurial sector and the financial inter­
mediaries are introduced into the general equilibrium framework. In order to understand 
the sequence of events in this economy, Table (1.1) summarizes what happens within 
each period.
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Table 1.1: Sequence of Events within One Period
1 6t , the aggregate productivity shock, is realized.
2 Firms hire labor from households and entrepreneurs and rent capital from 
households. These inputs are used to produce the consumption good, Yt = 
6,F (K u Hu H f).
3 Households make their consumption and savings choice. All savings are deposited 
in financial intermediaries, which commit to purchase capital from entrepreneurs 
and return it to households by the end of the period.
4 Financial Intermediaries use the resources obtained from households to provide 
loans to entrepreneurs.
5 Entrepreneurs borrow resources from the Intermediaries. Entrepreneurs decide how 
to allocate their investment into risky and safe projects.
6 The idiosyncratic entrepreneurial technology shock is realized. Loans are repaid to 
the Intermediaries.
7 Intermediaries purchase all of the investment goods ffom entrepreneurs, and hands 
them to households. Banks end the period with no liquidity. Old entrepreneurs 
consume and die.
In what follows, all variables in upper case indicate aggregate quantities.
1.3.1 Households
There is a continuum of risk-averse households, who maximize expected lifetime 
utility of consumption, c*, and leisure, (1  — Lt), taking as given wages wt, the price of 
investment goods qu and the equilibrium rate of return on the investment goods rt+1 :
oo
E o Z P H c t A - L t ) .  (1 .1 1 )
t=0
At the beginning of every period households choose their labour supply, and their 
optimal labour-leisure choice is given by:
Ul  w  n  I 'n— 77T = V > t  (1.12)uc{t)
They then choose their optimal consumption. All savings are deposited in financial 
intermediaries, which commit to purchase investment goods ffom entrepreneurs and
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return them to households by the end of the period. These investment goods are then 
rented to firms, which use it for production the following period and pay in return an 
interest rate of 1 +  rt + 1 (which is stochastic and depends on the realization of 0t+1). The 
optimal savings and consumption choice is given by:
uc(t) = (5 Et n  , ~ 5) +  (1  +  rt+i)uc(t +  1 J--------- (1.13)
Qt
where uc(t) is the marginal utility of consumption in period t.
1.3.2 Firms
Firms produce the consumption good using a constant returns to scale production 
function:
Yt = 6tF{Ku Hu H et ) (1.14)
where K t is the stock of investment goods, Ht is aggregate labour supplied by 
households, and Hf = H e is labour supplied by entrepreneurial agents (which is con­
stant).
Perfect competition in the factor markets implies the following factor prices:
rt = 0fF1( t ) - l  (1.15)
wt = 0tF2(t) (1.16)
w\ = 0tF3(t) (1.17)
1.3.3 Market Clearing Conditions
There are four markets that need to clear in this economy: the markets for invest­
ment goods, consumption goods, entrepreneurial labour, and household labour. With 
regards to the last two, the labour supplied by households is equal to Ht — — rf)Lt
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on one hand, while on the other entrepreneurs supply labour inelastically and in the 
aggregate provide Hf = rj.
The aggregate resource constraint (goods market equilibrium) in terms of expendi­
tures is given by:
yt = (i -  v)ct + v e t + t ? i y  i:tt+ v i y  i i t + m  a.is)
i=Y,L,U i=Y,L,U
The first two terms in (1.18) capture aggregate consumption in this economy, by 
both households (Ct) and entrepreneurs (Cf). The third and fourth terms capture in­
vestment in the safe and risky technologies respectively by the three groups of entre­
preneurs (young, old lucky and old unlucky), while the fifth term deals with aggregate 
savings of young entrepreneurs.6
The market for investment goods used by consumption goods producing firms clears 
at the price of qt, according to the expression:
K t+1(qt) =  (1  -  S)Kt +  ^ < 1 ,
Qt
where Yte is entrepreneurial production of new capital, and is given by:
y te(Qt) =  Ws Pr ,M  0 -19)
i=Y,L,U z  i=Y,L,U
1.3.4 Recursive Equilibrium Conditions
The recursive competitive equilibrium is defined by decision rules for K t+1, Ht, 
{ l i , t } i= Y ,L ,u , {I %rtt} i=Y ,L ,u , ^i+ i, , ^ L, B ? , qt and ru as a fimction of K u 0t,
and { N } } i = LiU. The appendix provides a detailed explanation of these recursive equi­
6Households can only transfer resources from one period to the next by purchasing capital (even if  
they could use a safe storage technology with no return they would not use it as it would be rate-of-retum 
dominated by investment in k t + 1). Entrepreneurs on the other hand can only transfer any resources they 
have at the end o f  the period through a safe (zero-retum) storage technology.
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librium conditions, and of the computational procedure used to solve this model.
1.4 Calibration and Analysis of Steady State
1.4.1 Calibration
The model is parameterized at the non-stochastic steady state using values to repli­
cate long-run empirical regularities in U.S. post-World War II macro data. In addition 
the calibration is designed so the results are comparable with the existing quantitative 
studies on agency costs and business cycle fluctuations, such as Carlstrom and Fuerst 
(1997).
The final good production technology is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas of the form
Y, = 6tK f  H f H f
with a capital share (aK) of 0.36, a household labour share (a) of 0.63, and an entre­
preneurial labour share (a e) of 0.01. The share of entrepreneurial labour is positive 
to ensure that young entrepreneurs have positive net worth with probability one. It is 
chosen to be small so that the model dynamics closely resemble the standard RBC dy­
namics when the financial frictions in the model are removed. The capital depreciation 
rate is set to S = 0 .0 2 .
The technology shock, 0t , follows the process
log @t+l = p log Qt +  (Te£t+1
where a =  .01 and p =  0.95, and et+i ~  N (0,1).
The utility function for households is of the form
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c1 -7  -  1 
U = - ------ -  + v (l - L )
1 - 7
with v chosen so that the steady-state level of hours is equal to 0.3. The intertemporal 
preference rate is set at (3 — 0.99, and the risk aversion parameter 7  is set at 1, but 
higher values (up to 4) are also tested for robustness.
With regards to the calibration of the entrepreneurial sector parameters, we start by 
calibrating the pledgeability of entrepreneurial capital (captured by 11) to match em­
pirically documented Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratios for commercial mortgage lending to 
small and medium-sized enterprises. Titman, Tompaidis, and Tsyplakov (2005) find 
that the LTV ratios (measured as the loan amount divided by the appraised value of the 
property) have values between 60% and 80% for over 75% of the loans the study, and 
an average of 65%.7 In numerical simulations, the choice of this parameter is shown 
to be quite important for my results. For that reason I use a conservative choice in my 
baseline calibration of 70%. The two remaining parameters relate to the entrepreneurial 
risky technology (the multiplicative productivity factor, and the parameter regulating 
its curvature and hence the intensity of the demand for risk and liquidity management), 
and they are calibrated to match two empirical regularities: ( 1) the risk premium, and 
(2) the share of loans that are issued on a commitment basis. Regarding the latter, I use 
the value document by Kashyap et al. (2002), who find that 70% of bank lending by 
U.S. small firms is through credit lines. Regarding the former, I follow Carlstrom and 
Fuerst (1997) and use the average spread between the 3-month commercial paper rate 
and the prime rate (which for the period from April 1971 to June 1996 equals 187 basis 
points).
7They use data on 26,000 individual commercial mortgages originated in the U.S. between 1992 and 
2002.
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Figure 1.2: Composition of entrepreneurial investment and aggregate capital in the 
steady state, as a function of changes in idiosyncratic volatility.
1 .4 .2  A n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  S t e a d y  S t a t e
The analysis of the steady state of this model yields some interesting results. The 
steady state is obtained by eliminating the volatility of the aggregate productivity para­
meter, but preserving the idiosyncratic uncertainty element.
I then conduct an analysis by which I perform a mean-preserving increase in the 
idiosyncratic volatility parameter. The results are that the steady state composition of 
entrepreneurial investment shifts to a safer profile with higher volatility, and that the 
aggregate stock of investment goods in the economy is substantially lower, as is clear 
from figure (1.2). This is in contrast to standard models of credit frictions in which the 
anticipation of future financing problems do not affect current investment decisions. 
Those models predict that the share of risky productive investment is not sensitive to 
idiosyncratic volatility, and I reproduce that result in this model by removing the source 
of precautionary behaviour in firms, as is shown as well in figure (1.2) in the series 
labeled "No Precautionary" .8
8The transformation o f  the model into one in which there is no precautionary behavior is straight­
forward and is done by altering the functional form o f the second period entrepreneurial production 
opportunity to one with constant returns to scale in the only factor, entrepreneurial capital (as opposed 
to the benchmark setup with decreasing returns to scale in that same factor). This implies that the entre­
preneur is no longer concerned with smoothing his net worth at the beginning o f the second period and 
hence has no demand for insurance.
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1.5 The Precautionary Channel of Amplification
I analyze the dynamics of this model by studying the behaviour of different ag­
gregates in response to changes in aggregate productivity, or total factor productivity 
(TFP). I compare the response of the relevant aggregate variables in three models: a 
completely standard real business cycle (RBC) framework, a model with borrowing 
constraints but no precautionary channel, and the full model introduced in the previ­
ous section. The purpose of this section is to clarify how the amplification mechanism 
described in the previous sections works and in particular to highlight what the contri­
bution of this mechanism is with respect to the standard financial accelerator.
I focus the attention on some aggregate quantities and prices that relate to entrepre­
neurial investment; in particular I will study the dynamic behaviour of the composition 
of entrepreneurs’ investment between safe and risky investment, the price qt of the in­
vestment goods produced by entrepreneurs and bought by firms, aggregate investment 
by consumption good-producing firms, and finally aggregate output. The results are in 
figure (1.3).
First, the dynamics of the standard RBC model are well known. I obtain these 
dynamics by eliminating the capital-producing sector (entrepreneurs) and assuming an 
infinitely elastic supply of capital at the price of unity. The response of investment and 
output mimics closely the evolution of the underlying technology process. In essence, 
there is little propagation in this version. The price of capital qt does not react to changes 
in technology because of the assumption of infinite elasticity, and there are no compo­
sitional effects of investment changes.
Secondly, the dynamics of the standard financial accelerator can be obtained in the 
current framework through several ways. One is by not giving firms an investment 
choice and assuming that they are permanently credit constrained: firms will simply 
invest as much as possible in the risky activity every period. Another is by linearizing
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the second period production function: this way, firms have no incentive to smooth 
second-period investment, and simply maximize first period investment in the risky 
activity and do not invest in the safe asset. I adopt the latter approach, without loss 
of generality. In either case, there is no compositional effect and no precautionary 
behaviour: even if firms anticipate rationally that the severity of credit constraints may 
increase the following period, this does not affect their current behaviour. This is the 
essence of the contribution of the precautionary mechanism introduced in this paper. 
The idea is not that firms behave in an irrational way by not reacting to the anticipation 
of future credit constraints, but that either the are unable to react (because they have 
no discretion as to how to invest or save, or because they always operate in a comer 
solution because they are assumed to be permanently credit constrained, etc...) or that 
they are unwilling to react (they have no motive to smooth end-of-period wealth, which 
implies they are risk neutral and that returns to investment the following period are 
linear in beginning-of-period net worth).
The cyclical dynamics in the standard financial accelerator are well known as well. 
Financial imperfections may amplify and add persistence to the effects of technology 
shocks, as is the case in figure (1.3), but do not affect the composition of investment. 
Two comments are in order. First, it is worthwhile noting that there is some controversy 
in the literature as to the extent to which financial imperfections dampen or amplify 
cycles, and different papers analyze scenarios in which one or the other result obtains. 
The focus of the results in this paper are on how taking into account firms’ precaution­
ary behaviour changes the way we should understand the way financial frictions affect 
aggregate investment dynamics, and in that respect contributes to that discussion. Sec­
ondly, there is less controversy in the literature surrounding the persistence effects of 
financial frictions, at least in terms of the qualitative effects. In the results in this paper 
the persistence effects are dampened with respect to frameworks in which entrepreneurs 
are modelled as infinitely lived and hence their net worth (the aggregate level and its
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distribution) becomes an important state variable that adds substantial persistence. In 
my model, entrepreneurs live for two periods, and hence the effect of net worth dynam­
ics is significantly smaller. In any event, in the context of my framework it affects both 
the standard financial accelerator version and the precautionary channel version in the 
same way, and thus does not affect the comparison of both, which is the object of study.
Finally, if we observe the changes that occur in the aggregate dynamics as a result 
of considering firms’ precautionary behaviour, we can notice that they are significant. 
The main idea of the precautionary channel is that if future expected borrowing condi­
tions worsen, then entrepreneurs will adjust the riskiness of their investment portfolio 
by reducing their exposure to the risky technology. When a negative shock hits, firms 
understand that the shock will be persistent and that it means that the probability of be­
ing financially constrained next period increases. They react by decreasing their share 
of risky investment. This works both ways, so when a positive shock hits the economy 
and future expected borrowing conditions improve, entrepreneurs increase the riskiness 
of their investment portfolio. The precautionary model implies a larger contemporane­
ous response to shocks (more amplification), and smaller persistence. The intuition for 
this result is that firms anticipate future financial restrictions and react immediately. In 
the standard financial accelerator framework, in papers such as Carlstrom and Fuerst 
(1997) and Bemanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (2000), firms invest as much as they can 
at every point in time. This adds persistence to their effects; a negative shock may 
imply that entrepreneurs’ net worth decreases slowly to reach its minimum several pe­
riods later, with entrepreneurial investment following that pattern. Taking into account 
a precautionary behaviour and the flexibility to adjust the investment portfolio means 
forward-looking firms may choose to react in advance to that to minimize future credit 
rationing.
Another important result is the asymmetry of effects, which can be seen in figure 
(1.4). Hansen and Prescott (2002) and Sichel (1993) find evidence that positive shocks
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Figure 1.4: Asymmetry of Effects: Impulse Response Functions to a Positive and a 
Negative One Standard Deviation Shock to Productivity (Periods = quarters). (FA = 
Financial Accelerator M odel; PREC =  Precautionary M odel)
produce smaller positive output effects than negative shocks produce negative output 
effects. The existing theory tries to explain this on the basis of capacity constraint mod­
els (Hansen and Prescott (2002), Danziger (2003)) and sticky price models (Devereux 
and Siu (2003)). In my framework, the key element to these results is in the nonlinear 
dynamics of the endogenous borrowing constraints. The ratio of risky to safe invest­
ment I r , t / I . , t  is procyclical in an unconstrained scenario, which implies that when credit 
constraints are taken into account, and bearing in mind that I s is collateralizable and Ir 
is not, these will tend to bind more in downturns. The intuition is that in downturns 
several factors concur: profits are low, collateral values (qt) are also low, and collater­
alizable assets become relatively more expensive (or rather, relatively less profitable, as 
the relative profitability gap between the risky technology and the safe one increases 
in downturns9). These three factors combine to make borrowing constraints counter­
cyclical, and hence to make the effects of this mechanism strongly asymmetric. This
9This is clear by observing the ratio o f  the risky, productive investment as a share o f  safe investment
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asymmetry in the pricing behaviour generates asymmetry in both the model with and 
the model without the precautionary element, but more so in the latter, the reason being 
that an asset price feedback effect kicks in in the precautionary model: firms do not 
internalize the future pricing effects of their current actions.
1.6 Empirical Evidence
In this section I present evidence that provides support to the predictions of the 
model analyzed in the previous sections. The predictions refer broadly to ex-ante re­
actions by entrepreneurial firms when the expectations about future risk-sharing condi­
tions vary. These reactions may manifest themselves in particular decisions with respect 
to the choice of production technology along the dimensions of riskiness, length or col- 
lateralizability of the capital used, the choice of the share of cash and liquid securities 
as a share of total assets, and the choice of the level of investment.
Special care has to be taken to distinguish the effects of the specific channel identi­
fied in this paper, with the effects of the traditional credit channel. In particular, some 
of the empirical studies carried out to test the standard credit channel could be picking 
up the effects of the insurance channel identified in this paper. If firms’ investment sen­
sitivity to monetary policy shocks or productivity shocks is higher for small firms with 
a high degree of agency problems, this could be due to either a lack of ability to borrow 
to invest (a corner solution), or a lack of willingness to carry out such investments as 
an optimal decision that weighs in the prospect of being credit constrained in the fu- 
in the unconstrained scenario, given by:
ir ,t+ 1   "I" e] c
* s ,t+ i  Qt+i® s d
In good times, short run returns are high (q is high, which is the only element driving the immediate 
returns), and relatively more so than long-run returns given that the mean-reverting process driving qt is 
dampened by the constant term e, making returns to the risky activity fluctuate less across the business 
cycle.
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ture and not being able to undertake profitable investment opportunities that may arise 
(an interior solution). If banks’ loan supply is sensitive to monetary policy shocks or 
productivity shocks, and small firms with high agency problems are especially bank- 
dependent, then their investment reaction may be due to an inability to borrow today, 
or to the expectation that the current credit crunch will persist in time and may result 
in an inability to borrow in the future to withstand liquidity shocks or undertake invest­
ment opportunities. The empirical tests carried out in this section take this observational 
equivalence into account.
The broad prediction tested is that if risk-sharing conditions worsen in the present, 
or are expected to worsen in the future, then the asset composition strategies of high 
agency cost firms should reflect this in a particular way. We need to operationalize both 
elements of the prediction, the exogenous explicative component, and the endogenous 
reaction. We do so in a number of ways below, and we divide the analysis into two 
subsections, one analysing a firm-level panel data set of European firms, and another 
using aggregate U.S. investment data.
1.6.1 U.S. Aggregate Investment Data, the Business Cycle and Credit 
Conditions
In order to distinguish between different types of investment along the riskiness di­
mension, one strategy is to study the behaviour of Research & Development investment 
as a fraction of total investment. Another strategy is to study the behaviour of long-term, 
structural investment, again as a share of total investment. The U.S. is particularly con­
venient to study these aspects of investment as there is abundant data on industrial R&D 
activity, provided by the National Science Foundation.
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R&D Investment Behaviour Across the Business Cycle
A component of investment which is likely to be very sensitive to liquidity insurance 
supply conditions is Research & Development spending. Some authors in the literature 
have pointed out the potential effect of business cycle fluctuations on research and de­
velopment investment. Geroski and Walters (1995), Fatas (2000) and Barlevy (2004) all 
find evidence of a positive relationship between output and R&D. 10 Other studies have 
looked further into the topic by analysing the composition of R&D spending, and how 
that varies across the cycle. Rafferty (2003a and 2003b) documents that basic research 
increases in downturns, while development is procyclical. He also analyses in that work 
if cash flow constraints have a role in the variations of total R&D spending, and finds 
that they do, which suggests that availability of means to insure against negative liquid­
ity shocks to those R&D projects should encourage investment in them. Interestingly, 
Hall (1992) finds that most R&D is financed by internal funds, which makes this type 
of investment especially reliant on being able to implement an optimal risk manage­
ment strategy that does not leave a firm willing to engage in R&D development at some 
future stage totally dependent on external funds for that venture. 11
I show in figure (1.5) some evidence for the cyclical pattern of R&D spending using 
data from the National Science Foundation for the United States from 1953 to 2005. I 
plot the share of R&D investment as a share of total fixed capital formation and compare 
the evolution of this ratio against NBER dated recessions in the United States. Again, 
this chart shows evidence of sharp contractions in the share of R&D spending at the 
onset of recessions and fast recoveries following the beginning of the upward section of 
the cycle.
I have conducted some further analysis studying variations in the share of R&D
,0Geroski and Walters (1995) measure R&D spending by the number o f  patent applications, while 
Fatas (2000) and Barlevy (2004) look at R&D expenditures as reported by companies in the United 
States.
11 More evidence in this line is provided by Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), who document that R&D 
spending at the firm level is very sensitive to cash flow.
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investment for the U.S. from National Science Foundation)
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investment exploiting certain differences at the sectorial level. The main premise is that 
certain types of firms should show a higher sensitivity in their ratios of R&D investment 
as a fraction of total investment than others. In particular, the model suggests that 
smaller firms (a proxy for higher agency costs), firms in more volatile sectors, and firms 
in sectors with a higher external finance dependence, should show a higher sensitivity.
Some tentative evidence, without resorting to formal econometric analysis, for all 
these three is shown below. One of the analyses looks at sectorial variation in invest­
ment across the cycle, where sectors are classified according to their volatility using a 
number of different criteria.12 My criterion to classify industries as per their volatility 
uses a combination of measures such as the standard deviation of real wages, of input 
prices, of output prices, and the average horizon of investment projects within sectors. 
The data is divided into very low volatility sectors and very high volatility sectors (ig­
noring moderate sectors), and shown in figure (1.6) below. The data suggests that R&D 
spending is more sensitive in highly volatile sectors, as a share of total investment, in 
line with my predictions.
Another interesting measure is that of external dependence, where the precise de­
finitions and classification are taken ffom Raj an and Zingales (1998). Again the data 
is divided into very low dependence sectors and very high dependence sectors (ignor­
ing moderate sectors), and shown in figure (1.7) below. The data suggests that R&D 
spending sensitivity is not significantly different in both groups of firms. This lack of 
evidence may be due to either a lack of the effect posited, or indeed a failure in the 
specific index used, and I am currently investigating this more deeply.
Finally, I use average firm size within each sector to again divide the data into very 
low average size sectors and very high average size sectors (ignoring moderate sectors), 
and the results are shown in figure (1.8) below. The data suggests that R&D spending 
is more pro-cyclical in sectors with smaller sized firms, in line with my predictions.
12This measure is in line with that used by Huizinga (1992), and I compare my classification with the 
one in that paper for robustness.
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Figure 1.6: Annual % Variation in R&D Private Spending as a Share of Total Investment 
- Industries Classified by Volatility (using criterion that weighs input and output price 
volatility, uncertainty in outcome of investment projects, average duration of projects, 
etc...)
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Figure 1.8: % Variations in ratio of R&D expenditures as a share of total investment
4 2
Long-Term Structural Investment and Credit Standards
One broad classification of investment with relevance for the topic of uncertainty is 
along the dimension of duration of the project. Longer projects, which carry a higher 
risk of facing intermediate episodes of reinvestment requirements, and a higher risk 
about returns inherent in that the conditions about demand and other aspects so far 
into the future will be more uncertain, will not be undertaken in case the risk-sharing 
opportunities are low. I construct a measure of the share of long-term investment as 
a proportion of total investment, using data from the OECD, and study how it varies 
across the cycle. The raw numbers for the United States are plotted in figure (1.9), 
which captures the evolution of this ratio over the past 50 years. Also plotted are the 
NBER dated recessions that have taken place during this period of time. The chart 
shows a clear cyclical pattern that is common to most of the recession episodes that 
occurred: the share of long-term investment falls significantly during downturns, and 
recovers with some lag as the boom begins.
With regards to the first element in the insurance channel, the worsening of expected 
insurance conditions, available U.S. data provides the opportunity to measure varying 
Bank credit conditions through the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lend­
ing Practices. This is a survey of approximately sixty large domestic banks and twenty- 
four U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks conducted by the Federal Reserve. It 
is conducted quarterly, and questions cover changes in the standards and terms of the 
banks’ lending and the state of business and household demand for loans.
The premise is that if credit conditions worsen (standards for credit lines increase,...) 
or are expected to worsen (bank liquidity expected to fall, collateralizable asset values 
expected to fall,...), high agency cost firms, and firms in industries with (a) riskier pro­
files and (b) higher financing needs, should be hit worst, and hence should see a higher 
reaction of their long-term structural investment ratio (as a fraction of total investment). 
As preliminary evidence, I show below, in chart (1.10), the reaction of the share of
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Figure 1.9: Long-Term Investment as a Share of Total Investment (Data for investment 
for the U.S. from OECD)
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long-term structural investment as a share of total investment for firms of all sizes for 
the U.S. The evidence is not in line with the predictions of this paper, as the graph 
shows that riskier, long-term investment responds positively to credit conditions. Lack 
of availability of data disaggregation by firm-size may explain this puzzling result, and 
I am currently studying this issue further.
Credit Standards are measured as the percent of Loan Officers reporting that they 
have tightened their credit standards during the past 3 months (Minus percent which 
have eased), and the composition of investment is calculated according to three different 
measures:
• Share 1 = (Structures + Residential Investment) / Gross private domestic invest­
ment
• Share 2 = (Structures + Residential Investment) / Fixed investment
• Share 3 = Structures / Nonresidential Fixed investment
where gross private domestic investment = Fixed Investment (Structures + Equip­
ment and software + Residential) + Change in private inventories for small firms.
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Figure 1.10: Credit Standards and the Share of Long-Term Structural Investment as a 
Fraction of Total Investment (US Data)
1.7 Discussion and Conclusion
There exists a large body of research on the role of financial frictions in amplifying 
macroeconomic shocks. Most work has been focused on how firms’ investment capacity 
is affected in recessions by tighter borrowing constraints or by a decreased supply of 
intermediated finance, and has studied how firms are constrained in the amount they can 
invest ex-post. There has been little focus however on a propagation mechanism that 
studies how cyclical changes in the risk-sharing capacity of the financial system may be 
affecting /zr/ws ’ willingness to bear risk and acting to propagate the cycle by affecting 
the risk profile of their investment portfolio (the composition as well as the amount).
This paper is motivated by two sets of observations. On the one hand, there is ev­
idence that constrained firms shift the composition of their investment towards safer 
and more liquid technologies in recessions, while this is not the case for unconstrained 
firms. On the other hand there is evidence that credit constrained firms display a pre­
cautionary behaviour induced by future expected financing constraints that significantly
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affects their real and financial policies.
Based on these observations, I incorporate these precautionary effects into a dy­
namic stochastic general equilibrium framework to study their macroeconomic impli­
cations. I use this framework to address two important questions. Can a mechanism 
capturing this precautionary element have significant consequences for aggregate in­
vestment and output dynamics? Can this mechanism account for the observed variation 
in the composition of aggregate and firm-level investment across the business cycle?
This paper identifies a novel amplification mechanism of macroeconomic shocks 
based on time-varying risk-sharing opportunities that affect firms’ preference for the 
risk profile of their portfolio of investment projects. This amplification mechanism is 
shown to be quantitatively large and asymmetric. On the other hand, this framework 
is able to account for the empirically documented cyclical variation in the composition 
of real investment, a feature which the existing models studying the macroeconomic 
implications of financial constraints cannot account for. In particular, it is shown how 
following worsening expected financing conditions, firms shift to safer but lower re­
turn investments, or, absent alternative investment opportunities, to liquid securities 
and cash, and how these effects are stronger for high agency cost firms and for firms in 
highly volatile industries.
A next step in this research agenda is to study if this mechanism can be potentially 
enhanced by financial intermediaries’ own credit constraints, creating a powerful feed­
back mechanism between entrepreneurial investment choices, asset prices, and banks’ 
balance sheet conditions and insurance capacity. The ability of financial intermediaries 
and capital markets to satisfy firms’ liquidity demand may itself be subject to similar 
countercyclical constraints as non-financial firms, creating the potential for feedback ef­
fects between firms’ investment decisions and intermediaries’ balance sheet conditions. 
A main source of risk and liquidity management for firms are financial intermediaries, 
both using ex-ante protection through credit lines, and ex-post protection by borrowing
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on the spot market. Several empirical studies have found that loan supply to small firms 
is curtailed in downturns and following monetary policy shocks (Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1993)). The feedback effect through entrepreneurial capital valuations and financial 
intermediaries’ commitment capacity could work as follows. Following a negative 
aggregate shock, firms increase their demand for ex-ante protection by financial in­
termediaries through credit lines. Intermediaries, however, are also subject to limited 
commitment and collateral constraints, and need to back their loan commitments us­
ing the loans extended to entrepreneurs as collateral. Intermediaries’ ability to provide 
these loan commitments may decrease both due to lower valuation of existing loans, 
and lower demand for loans. This introduces a premium on liquidity services by banks, 
and forces firms to rely even more on operational hedging by adjusting the riskiness 
of their production technologies, reinforcing the initial effect. This further depresses 
the valuation of capital, and in turn the valuation of the loan portfolio of banks, further 
limiting their liquidity commitment capacity. A feedback effect from entrepreneurial 
investment composition choices to asset prices, loan portfolio valuations and financial 
intermediaries’ liquidity provision capacity arises. The theoretical underpinnings and 
the quantitative relevance of this extension is left for future research.
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1.A Appendix
l .A .l  General Equilibrium - Recursive Equilibrium Conditions
The recursive competitive equilibrium is defined by decision rules for K t + 1 , Cu Ht, 
{ l i , t } i = Y , L , u ,  { I lr , t } i = Y , L , u , N f + 1 , N ? + I l  B ? ,  , B ? , q t  and r u  as a fimction of K u  0 U
and { N l } i = L p .  The recursive equilibrium conditions are given below. First, there is a 
savings supply decision by households, and a labour supply decision, given respectively 
by:
u \  a  ip  f  u  , i \  f e + l ( l  ~  +  Q t F i ( t ) \  \uc(t) = pE t <uc(t + 1)----------------------  > , (1.20)
and:
= 0tF2(t). (1.21)
uc[t)
The investment good market clearing obtains when the following equation is satis­
fied:
K t+i{qt) = (1 -  S)Kt +  rjas £ > *  P8it(qt) +  ^
i=Y,L,U z  i=Y,L,U
The aggregate resource constraint requires that
Yt =  ( l - r j ) C t +  r iQ  +  v l 2** + >7 £  ^  K,, +  V^t (1.22)
i=Y,L,U i=Y,L,U
The aggregate productivity factor 6 follows the stochastic process:
log Qt+i = plogQt +  (Je£t+1 (1.23)
1.A.2 Computational Appendix
The equilibrium of this model is solved using the Parameterized Expectations Algo­
rithm (PEA), a method commonly used to solve nonlinear stochastic dynamic models
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(see Marcet (1988), den Haan and Marcet (1990), and Christiano and Fisher (2000)). 
It is a non-finite state-space algorithm that approximates the conditional expectation of 
one or more equilibrium conditions by using a parametric function of the state variables. 
I have chosen this solution method as it allows me to deal with (a) the relatively large 
number of endogenous state variables (applying discrete state-space methods might be 
problematic because of the ‘curse of dimensionality’) and (b) the occasionally binding 
inequality constraints.
To solve this model I need to approximate two expectational equations. First, I ap­
proximate the households’ euler equation, from which I obtain current period consump­
tion Ct. Second, I also need to approximate the optimality condition of entrepreneurs 
from which I obtain current period investment in the risky technology by the young 
entrepreneurs.
For the choice of approximating function for (1.20) I can use homotopy and intro­
duce a function based on the closed form solution that exists for the one-sector stochas­
tic growth model with logarithmic utility and full depreciation. For the second equation 
I have tried with polynomial functions of different orders, discarding terms for which 
the explanatory power is small.
The rest of the endogenous variables are calculated each period, where the length 
of simulation for each iteration is T  = 5,000. The parameters of the approximating 
functions are recalculated after each iteration until convergence.
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Chapter 2
Aggregate Liquidity and 
Entrepreneurial Risk
2.1 Introduction
The episode of financial market turbulence in 2007/2008 has highlighted the im­
portance of liquidity for the normal functioning of the financial system. It has shown 
how even large financial corporations with unparalleled access to capital markets suffer 
from liquidity shortages, and also how certain assets have a very volatile degree of liq­
uidity. Beyond this casual observation, there is ample evidence that liquidity shortages 
are often linked to economic slowdowns, and also that liquidity is an important factor 
for asset pricing. In this paper I focus on how issues of aggregate liquidity affect an 
arguably more vulnerable set of agents, small and medium sized entrepreneurial firms 
with limited access to capital markets.
Several recent trends may have affected the relevance of liquidity for investment 
and output dynamics, and, in order to understand how, it is important to distinguish 
between the public and the private supply of liquidity. With regards to the public supply 
of liquidity {outside liquidity), the fiscal positions of many countries have improved in
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recent years, resulting in a decrease in the supply of government debt.1 With regards 
to the private supply of liquidity {inside liquidity), innovation in the financial sector has 
changed the availability and characteristics of liquid securities available, an example of 
which is the recent boom in the securitization of mortgage loans. These recent trends in 
government finance and in financial development combined have had important effects 
on financial sector liquidity.
This paper starts by introducing a general equilibrium characterization of liquidity. 
Firms without investment opportunities demand liquidity to be able to finance future 
investments, and investing firms create liquidity by issuing claims against their future 
returns. Additionally, the government issues debt to finance its budget deficits. The 
contribution of this paper is to analyze the determinants of the supply of private liquidity 
(inside liquidity) in conjunction with the availability of publicly supplied liquidity, in a 
model where firms act both as consumers and creators of liquidity.
The first main result of the paper concerns the effect of variations of the public sup­
ply of liquidity on steady state investment and capital, and three different channels are 
identified. On the one hand, an increase in supply decreases the cost for non-investing 
entrepreneurs of acquiring liquidity, and hence makes self-insurance cheaper and pro­
motes a higher level of investment (the crowding-in channel). On the other hand, an 
increase in supply increases the rate of return on government debt and decreases the 
demand for equity issued by entrepreneurs, hence decreasing aggregate investment (the 
crowding out channel). Finally, variations in government debt cause a redistribution of 
wealth between the entrepreneurial sector and workers (the inter-sectorial redistribu­
tive effect), the sign and strength of which depends crucially on how the taxation that 
finances the interest cost of that debt is allocated between these two groups of agents.2
]See figure (2.6) in the appendix, that shows the evolution o f  US public debt as a share o f GDP over 
the past decades.
2 In the model, in equilibrium all debt is held by entrepreneurs, so increases in debt when the real 
rate o f  return is positive and entrepreneurs are not fully taxed for the interest cost o f  that debt result in 
a transfer between workers and entrepreneurs. This should not be confused with the redistributive effect 
o f government debt variations within the entrepreneurial sector; those transfers are the essence o f  the
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I show that when comparing in isolation the first two channels, the crowding-in ef­
fect dominates when the degree of financial frictions is high (low borrowing capacity 
and low liquidity of equity of entrepreneurs), and vice-versa. In other words, addi­
tional liquidity is most valuable when borrowing constraints are tight and equity is very 
illiquid. Absent financial frictions, the crowding-out effect dominates. The redistrib­
utive effect is shown to be ambiguous in general. It is most likely to be negative (i.e. 
for increases in debt to transfer wealth from entrepreneurs to workers) when financial 
frictions are severe and government debt carries a liquidity premium large enough to 
justify negative real rates of return to government debt. Two scenarios are identified in 
which, when considering the three channels together, the effects of government debt on 
aggregate investment are non-monotonic (reducing investment for low values of debt- 
to-GDP, and increasing investment beyond a threshold).
The second set of results concerns the asset pricing implications of the model. The 
features of the model introduced, and in particular those related to liquidity, that can 
bring us closer to resolving some of the main ongoing asset pricing puzzles are iden­
tified. The debt-to-GDP ratio, the degree of financial constraints, and the liquidity of 
equity are shown to significantly affect asset prices, and I also show which parameter 
conditions are needed to match the observed asset pricing facts better. In particular, I 
show that there is a negative relationship between the debt-to-GDP ratio and the eq­
uity premium, which can help understand the reduction in the equity premium in recent 
decades.
Finally, I study how variations in the determinants of liquidity affect an economy’s 
response to productivity and liquidity shocks. The contemporaneous response of ag­
gregate investment and output to productivity shocks is larger in economies with lower 
levels of government debt. Firms rely to a greater extent on equity for self-insurance, 
the supply of which endogenously co-moves with the cycle and acts to amplify the
crowding-in effect, as they allow a better allocation o f  resources to investing entrepreneurs.
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effect of shocks. The model also offers a new explanation for the documented counter­
cyclical pattern of the equity premium. Equities provide a worse hedge against the risk 
of having an investment opportunity and being liquidity constrained in a downturn than 
do government bonds, and hence agents holding equities require a higher premium in 
downturns. I also study the effect of liquidity shocks, and show that shocks to the liq­
uidity of firms’ equity affect investment and output to a greater extent in economies 
with a low level of government debt.
Literature Review
This paper is related to various strands of the literature. It builds on the litera­
ture studying the effects of the public supply of liquidity on private investment, such 
as Woodford (1990) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). The differences with both are 
important. In Woodford, the private supply of liquidity is not considered by assum­
ing that entrepreneurs cannot borrow at all, and the only means of saving for non­
investing entrepreneurs is government debt. Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) do consider 
the private supply of liquidity, but in a context where there is no channel through which 
government-supplied liquidity can crowd-out private investment. Additionally, in both 
papers, there is only one type of agent, entrepreneurs, and hence the issue of the redis­
tribution of wealth through government debt and taxation between different sectors of 
the economy (workers and entrepreneurs in my framework) cannot be studied.
This paper is also related to the recent research that explores the asset pricing im­
plications of production-based models. Cochrane (1991) and (1996) shows that such 
a model can fit the data better than a standard consumption-based model. His model 
however assumes complete markets, unlike this one, and hence does not study issues 
of liquidity. A more recent contribution is Jermann (2008), whose analysis is similar 
to Cochrane’s and does not consider the role of financial frictions. Gomes, Yaron, and 
Zhang (2006) is an empirical study of the significance of factors related to firms’ fi­
nancial constraints in explaining the cross-section of equity returns. Finally, a closely
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related paper is Holmstrom and Tirole (2001), which is a theoretical study that tries to 
bridge the gap between corporate finance and asset pricing.
This paper also builds on the literature studying the aggregate implications of en­
dogenous borrowing constraints, with papers such as Bemanke and Gertler (1989), Kiy- 
otaki and Moore (1997), and Bemanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (2000), and particularly 
to Kiyotaki and Moore (2008), who also study the effects of liquidity on investment 
and capital accumulation. In particular, the model in this paper builds on Kiyotaki and 
Moore (2008) by extending their framework to include government debt.
2.2 Model
Consider an infinite-horizon, stochastic, discrete time economy with three agents: 
entrepreneurs, workers and a government. There are two goods in this economy, con­
sumption goods and capital goods. All entrepreneurs can produce consumption goods 
using labour from the workers and capital, but only some entrepreneurs have the oppor­
tunity to produce capital in a given period. One important ingredient in the model is 
that the combination of financial constraints and the stochastic arrival of investment op­
portunities creates a demand for liquidity, and this demand can only be met by holding 
government debt and entrepreneurial equity.
I will now analyze separately the optimization of entrepreneurs and workers and the 
behaviour of the government.
2.2.1 Entrepreneurs
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs with expected lifetime utility
oo
E 0 ' 5 2 P t u ( c t ) ,
t=0
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where 0 < (3 < 1 and u(c) = In c.
Production Technologies
Entrepreneurs have access to two production technologies. On the one hand they 
can, every period, produce consumption goods using labour and capital according to 
the production function
yt = a tk f l I '01,
where 0 < a < 1, and at is a stochastic productivity factor which is equal across 
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs do not have any labour endowment, and hire workers at 
the market rate wt for that purpose.
On the other hand, entrepreneurs also have access occasionally to a technology 
that converts it units of the consumption good into capital one-for-one to be used the 
following period. Total capital next period is thus
h + i  =  (1 — $)kt  +  i t ,
where 5 is the rate of depreciation of capital. The opportunity to produce capital is 
not available every period to every entrepreneur, and arrives only with probability 7r in 
any given period, and this arrival is independently distributed across entrepreneurs and 
time.
Financial Constraints and Demand for Liquidity
Entrepreneurs can finance themselves by issuing equity et. From the point of view 
of the agent purchasing that equity, the rate of return from purchasing one unit at price 
qt is [rt +1 +  (1 — S)qt+i\, where rt+\ =  at+\ a k ^ l ] ~ a. Effectively, the purchase of one 
unit of equity gives the same return as the purchase of one unit of capital, which will 
also produce a return the following period of r t + 1 +  (1 — S)qt+1. Another way to see this
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is that all equity is fully collateralized using capital, and hence provides the same return 
as capital. For this reason from now on we will consider capital and outside equity as 
the same for the purposes of entrepreneurs’ choices, denote it nt and call it "equity".
Equity issuance by entrepreneurs is subject to financial constraints. More specifi­
cally, entrepreneurs can only pledge a fraction 6 of the returns to investment.3
et < 0it (2 .1)
The budget constraint for an investing entrepreneur (denoted with superscript i) in 
period t is thus:
cj +  it +  r} =  rtnt + qt{ ( l - 5 ) n t - [ n l+1- ( i t - e \ ) } } +  (b t -  1 (2.2)
where b\ are the holdings of government debt of an investing entrepreneur, which 
becomes payable at the beginning of period t . New government debt 6*+1 can be pur­
chased at price 1/(1 +  rf+1), where rf+1 is the rate of return on government treasuries. 
The reason the predetermined variables (such as nt) do not carry a superscript is that 
they may refer both to an entrepreneur who was a saver or an investor in the previous 
period.
The budget constraint for a non-investing entrepreneur (saver, denoted with super­
script s) in period t is thus:
ct +  Tt = nn t +  qt[(l -  S)nt ~  nst+1 -  ej] +  ^  )  +  fte?• (2-3)
Expression (2.3) can be simplified if we take into account that equity owned and 
equity issued pay the holder the same return, and can thus be netted out. Taking this 
into account, and rearranging terms, we have:
3For a rationale for this type o f  collateral constraint see Hart and Moore (1994).
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+  Qtnst+1 =  rtn t + qt{ 1 -  6)nt +  b t
Optimization of an Investing Entrepreneur
In a similar way to Tobin’s q-theory of investment, whenever qt > 1, an investing 
entrepreneur will want to invest as much as possible to produce capital goods, given 
that producing capital costs one unit of the consumption good. When qt < 1, it is 
not profitable to issue equity to invest. The parameter conditions under which qt > 1 
obtains are in the Appendix.
When this is the case, then et =  6it, nlt+1 = (1 — 6)it and b*+1 = 0. Taking this into 
account, and substituting it out of expression (2.2) we get:
Given logarithmic preferences, consumption is equal to a fraction (1 — (3) of wealth:
Optimization of a Saving Entrepreneur
Entrepreneurs that do not have an investment opportunity face two choices: a con­
sumption/savings choice, and a portfolio choice.
As before, their consumption every period will be equal to a fraction (1 — j3) of
c l  +  qtn\+1 +  t \  = rtnt +  qt ( 1 -  6)nt +  b t .
c\ = (1 -  (3) {rtnt +  qt( 1 -  S)nt +  bt -  r lt } , (2.4)
and investment will be equal to:
[rtn t +  qt(l -  S)nt + bt -  r\] -  c\ 
1 -  Qqt
$ [rtnt +  qt( 1 -  S)nt + bt -  t \ \
1 -  Qqt
(2.5)
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wealth, and hence be equal to:
cst =  (1 -  13) [rtn t +  qt(l -  S)nt + bt -  rj] (2.6)
Their first order conditions with regards to the choice of entrepreneurial equity and 
government debt holdings are respectively:
u'(c$) =  7r g , | M'(cj+1) n+1 +  gt+l ( 1 ~ f?)|  (2.7)
+(1 -  7r)Et | « ' « +1) n+1 +  gt+l ( 1 ~ 5 ) |  (2.8)
and
« 'M ) =  Et {(1 +  rf+1)[7T«'(4+1) +  (1 -  7r)u'(c®+1)]} (2.9)
2.2.2 Workers
There is a continuum of workers with expected lifetime utility
OO
E 0 ^2/3 u
t=o
where 0 < /3 < 1, u'(.) > 0, u"{.) < 0, u  > 0 and v > 0. The budget constraint of 
workers is given by
b1
c7 +  9 t< +1 +  + t7 = wtir  +  +  <?<< +  b7
1 “i" Tt+1
where r t is lump sum taxation. Simple optimization delivers:
17 =  0 ) *  (2.10)
c7  =  Wt l7 . (2.11)
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Workers’ consumption is equal to their wage income each period (expression (2.11)), 
and the appendix shows why in the neighborhood of the steady state workers choose not 
to hold any equity or government debt.
2.2.3 Government
The role of government is simplified by assuming there is no government spending. 
It is just assumed to follow a target of total amount of one-period government debt B  
which it rolls over every period, where:
period, the government balances its budget by financing the interest rate cost of this 
debt with lump-sum taxation:
where r{, Tst and are respectively the lump-sum taxes charged to investing entre­
preneurs, saving entrepreneurs, and workers, which are weighted in expression (2.12) 
by their population share. The assumption of how the tax-burden is distributed is not 
innocuous, and the results in the following sections are robust to all possible assump­
tions.
Aggregation is made easy because the policy functions for consumption, investment 
and portfolio decisions are all linear in start of period holdings of government debt and 
equity. Furthermore, given that the process driving investment opportunities is indepen­
and where $t(s) is the distribution function of saving entrepreneurs in period t. Every
(2 .12)
2.3 General Equilibrium
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dently distributed across time and entrepreneurs, we can drop references to aggregate 
equity N t, and instead always refer to capital, given that in the aggregate N t = K t. The 
distinction will be kept, however, for savers’ future period net worth, 7Vts+1, for reasons 
that will become clear later.
The aggregate resource constraint for this economy is
where CJ, Q 3 and C™ are respectively the aggregate consumption of investing en­
trepreneurs, saving entrepreneurs, and workers, and are given by:
=  /* +  (! — (3) {r tK t +  qt( 1 -  S)Kt +  B t -  [tt t \  +  (1 -  tt)r ts] } +  {wt -  t ? )
Finally, the expression for aggregate portfolio choices of the saving entrepreneurs
Yt = Q  + C} + C f  +  It, (2.13)
&t =  i r ( l - p ) { r tK t + qt( l - 5 ) K t  + B - T i }
Cl = (1 - n ) ( l - l 3 ) { r tK t + qt ( l - 6 ) K t + B - T i }
(2.14)
(2.15)
(2.16)
where rt =  aatK I  1.
The aggregate resource constraint becomes, after rearranging:
(2.17)
Where I t = K t + 1 — (1 — S)K t .The expression for investment is:
It =
Tr(3[rtK t + qt( 1 -  S)Kt +  B t -  rj]
1 -  Qqt
(2.18)
is:
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p /  [r *+i +  9 m ( l  ~  6)] /g* 1 1 m
I  [^t+i +  g m ( l  ~  ^ )]^ ? + i +  J
=  jt f (1 +  r ^ i )  ] .
1 V t+1 + gt+i(l — ^ ) \ ^ t + i  + B t + i  J
Proofs for existence and uniqueness of a competitive equilibrium in the neighbor­
hood of the steady state are contained in the appendix.
2.4 Public Supply of Liquidity and Private Investment
In this section I will analyze the effects of changes in the aggregate amount of 
government debt on entrepreneurs’ investment in the steady state. Accordingly, I drop 
time subscripts in all variables in this section. The steady state equilibrium can be 
obtained by solving the following three equilibrium conditions for q, r9 and K :
aaK°‘+ Y ^ r g B -  [ t t t 4 +  (1 -  7r ) r s  +  r " ]  =  SK  (2.20)
+(1 -  0) {a a K a + q( 1 -  S)K + B  — [j it * +  (1 -  k ) t s ] } (2.21)
(1 -  0q)5K = ir/3[aaKa+q(l -  S)K  + B  -  t ‘ ] (2.22)
{aaKa~l+q{l — &)}/q =  (1 +  r9). (2.23)
Expression (2.20) is the aggregate resource constraint, (2.22) is the aggregate in­
vestment equation, and finally (2.23) is the aggregate portfolio equation.
A study of these equilibrium conditions reveals that in this economy there are three
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channels through which an increase in government debt affects aggregate investment. 
First, it relaxes investing entrepreneurs’ borrowing constraints and increases investment. 
This is the crowding-in effect, and is captured in expression (2.22). Second, it increases 
the rate of return on government debt and decreases demand for entrepreneurial equity 
from saving entrepreneurs, thus reducing investment. This is the crowding-out effect, 
and is captured in the aggregate version of the portfolio choice equation (expression 
(2.22)), and in the aggregate resource constraint (2.20).
Finally, an increase in government debt may vary the transfers between the govern­
ment and the entrepreneurial sector, and between the government and the workers (the 
inter-sectorial redistributive effect). For example, if entrepreneurs pay no taxes (they 
are fully paid by workers), and the government increases its borrowing, then the trans­
fers between the government and entrepreneurs increase, assuming the interest rates on 
government securities are positive. Effectively it implies an indirect transfer of wealth 
from workers to entrepreneurs. This should not be confused with the redistributive ef­
fect of government debt variations within the entrepreneurial sector; those transfers are 
the essence of the crowding-in effect, as they allow a better allocation of resources to 
investing entrepreneurs.
2.4.1 Crowding-in versus crowding-out
We will start by performing an analytical study of the first two channels only by 
abstracting from the inter-sectorial redistributive channel. In order to do so, I will study 
a particular case of the model introduced in the previous section. First, I assume that all 
taxes are paid for by the saver-entrepreneurs:
(2.24)
(2.25)
T.w 0. (2.26)
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Secondly, I assume that there is no idiosyncratic uncertainty and that for every en­
trepreneur an investment opportunity arises every other period with certainty. In par­
ticular, every period half of the entrepreneurs have an investment opportunity, and the 
other half save in advance of their investment opportunity the following period, a set-up 
which follows Woodford (1990). Finally, I make a particular assumption on how the 
taxes are paid for. The lump-sum taxes are paid by saver-entrepreneurs when they pur­
chase government debt. It could be interpreted as a fixed participation cost; as the cost 
to be able to trade in government treasuries.4 Given these assumptions, the aggregate 
resource constraint (2.20) simplifies to:
ctaKa = 5K  + ( 1 - P )  L ta K a + q *'1 ~  ^ K  + B j , (2.27)
and the investment equation becomes
(1  -  9q)6K = \p [a a K a +  5 ( 1  -  S)K  + B ] (2.28)
We are ready to assess the relative importance of the crowding-in and crowding-out 
effects.
Proposition 2.1 When the redistributive effects o f  government debt variations are ig­
nored, the effects o f  variations in government debt on aggregate investment in the steady 
state are monotonic. In particular, the crowding-in(out) effect dominates the crowding- 
out(in) effect for low(high) values o f 9 (borrowing constraints are tight(loose)).
Proof of this proposition in the appendix.
4Given this assumption, these taxes are not taken into account to calculate beginning o f  period wealth 
and hence consumption. Also, by the assumption that they are lump-sum, they do not enter the portfolio 
equation and do not distort the portfolio decision. Finally, given that the government sets taxes to finance 
the interest cost o f  debt every period, returns to government debt and taxes cancel each other in the 
aggregate resource constraint (2.20).
Assuming that there is no idiosyncratic uncertainty eliminates the possibility that, given lump-sum  
taxation, entrepreneurs with very low levels o f  net worth may end up with negative consumption.
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The intuition for this proposition is as follows. Additional liquidity is most valuable 
when borrowing constraints are tight, which happens when 6 is low. In the other ex­
treme, when credit constraints are so loose that entrepreneurs invest close to the uncon­
strained optimum, additional liquidity has little scope to improve a situation in which 
liquidity demand is well satisfied. Instead, most of the effect of the increase in govern­
ment debt arises because it competes with privately supplied liquidity for savers’ funds, 
and hence crowds out private equity and investment.
I also conduct some analytical exercises to get a better understanding of the rela­
tive effects of the crowding-in and crowding-out channels. Again focusing on the case 
in which the intersectorial redistribution channel is shut off, proposition 1 tells us that 
variations in the amount of debt cause monotonic variations in the level of steady-state 
capital. Indeed, if we observe figure (2.1) this is the case. Low values of the financial 
constraint 0, in other words tighter credit constraints, are associated with a net positive 
effect of government debt on steady state capital. The turning point in the base calibra­
tion occurs for values around 0 =  0.45, after which the crowding-out effect begins to 
dominate.5
2.4.2 Crowding-in, crowding-out and the redistributive channel
Now we are in a position to add to the analysis the inter-sectorial redistributive 
effect in the case in which the financing costs of government debt (which is held in 
its entirety by the entrepreneurial sector) are not fully paid with the entrepreneurial 
taxes, but instead workers’ taxes pay for a fraction of those costs. We drop the three 
assumptions of subsection 2.4.1 and instead we are back to the original model only that
5 Similar results are obtained when looking at comparative statics when the degree o f  liquidity <f> 
varies, in the model o f  the next section where imperfect resaleability o f  equity is introduced (see figure 
(2.7) in the Appendix).
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Figure 2.1: Effect of Variations in the Ratio of Debt to GDP on the Level of Capital, 
for Different Levels of Financial Constraints, when all Taxes are Paid for by Saving 
Entrepreneurs (i.e. when not taking into account the inter-sectorial distributive effects).
now we are going to assume that workers now pay all taxes, so:
r s =  0,
T* =  0,
1 + r9
B.
(2.29)
(2.30)
(2.31)
It is easy to show that the effects on investment of the inter-sectorial redistributive 
channel are ambiguous in general. Denoting transfers between workers and entrepre­
neurs induced by government debt and taxation by z(B),  these are equal to:
z(B) =
1 +  ra B,
and the sensitivity of transfers to variations in the amount of B  is
z '0  =
i
1 +  r9
r9 +
dr9 B  
dB 1 +  r9
6 6
When entrepreneurs pay no taxes, the distributive effect can be positive (from the 
point of view of entrepreneurs) or negative: positive when rG > 0, and positive or 
negative when rG < 0. Increases of government debt will always increase rG, which 
opens the possibility for non-monotonic effects when for low values of B , r G < 0 and 
the redistribution effect is negative, and beyond a threshold in the admissible parameter 
range for B, rG > 0 (and hence the redistribution effect is negative).
So, when the three channels are taken into account, and if as a result the effects 
of variations in government debt on aggregate investment in the steady state are non­
monotonic, then they are such that increases in government debt reduce(boost) aggre­
gate investment for low(high) levels of government debt. We now conduct some nu­
merical exercises to help us understand how the three channels interact with each other, 
always under the assumption described above that the redistribution between workers 
and entrepreneurs is at its potential maximum, which happens when workers pay all 
taxes. The analysis is done for empirically plausible ranges of government debt-to- 
GDP, which range from 20% to 100% for most countries.6
The results are in figure (2.2). As explained above the redistributive effects are 
ambiguous in general: in particular, they might be positive or negative when r9 < 0, 
which happens for low values of B, and are always positive when r9 > 0. The results in 
figure (2.2) suggest that the non-monotonicity is strongest when 0 is tightest. Bearing 
in mind our analytical results above, and inspecting the behaviour of the rate of return 
to government debt in the numerical exercises, the reason for these results can be found 
in the way that financial factors affect the sign and strength of the redistributive effect. 
In particular, it is for low values of 0 that the liquidity premium on government debt is 
highest, and hence for which the return on government debt r9 may be negative. For 
that reason, any negative redistributive effects are likely to happen for low values of 
6. So, the crowding-out effects that seem to be present only when credit constraints
6 See Jaimovich and Panizza (2006).
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are tight (which seems to contradict Proposition 1) are entirely due to the inter-sectorial 
redistributive effect. A similar, but less strong result is obtained when varying the degree 
of liquidity of equity (see figure (2.8)).
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Figure 2.2: Effect of Variations in the Ratio of Debt to GDP on the Level of Capital, for 
Different Levels of Financial Constraints, when all Taxes are Paid for by Workers (i.e. 
when taking into account the inter-sectorial distributive effects).
Two comments are in order when interpreting the behaviour of capital for high val­
ues of debt-to-GDP. In figure 2.2, steady state capital rise dramatically for values of 
debt-to-GDP approaching unity. This is due to two effects. First, the redistributive 
channel is positive and strongest at those levels, when the entrepreneurial sector is 
forced to hold a large amount of government debt and have to be compensated with 
a very high return r9 for it. And second, given that we are comparing steady state cap­
ital to debt-to-GDP, the denominator of the ratio of debt-to-GDP is also increasing at a 
large pace, such that the debt increases needed to increase the ratio become larger. It is 
important to note that the redistributive channel has a natural limit in that the wealth of 
the workers is limited, and secondly that even before it reaches its limit it is not realistic 
to assume the government would sustain such large systematic redistributions between 
the workers and the entrepreneurial sector.
6 8
2.5 A Model with Stochastic Liquidity of Equity
The previous sections have analyzed a model where both equity and government 
debt had the same degree of resaleability (liquidity). Introducing a wedge between the 
resaleability of both types of assets does not affect the results of studying to what extent 
financial frictions influence how the public supply of liquidity affects the private cre­
ation of liquidity and private investment by firms in the long run. To study the dynamics 
of this economy, however, it is interesting to consider a time-varying degree of liquidity 
of equity. Indeed, on the one hand it makes the model more realistic as we observe in 
reality that certain assets have a very volatile degree of liquidity. Pulvino (1998) doc­
uments a 30% price discount for commercial aircraft sales in depressed markets and 
Coval and Stafford (2007) report an average 7.9% price discount for fire sale stocks. 
The latter is particularly significant given that we consider that equities are amongst 
the most liquid assets. On the other hand, introducing time-varying liquidity of equity 
allows us to study the effects of exogenous shocks to liquidity.
The model is the same as before, only that now I assume that equity has limited 
resaleability, and only a fraction 0 of equity can be sold or re-mortgaged each period.
(1 -  5)nt -  [n\+1 -  {it -  e\)] < (j){l -  5)nt (2.32)
The assumptions on limited resaleability and limited pledgeability (the combination 
of expressions (2.32) and (2.1) above) imply the following liquidity constraints for an 
investing entrepreneur:
n \+ 1 >  (1 -  4>){l -  S)nt +  (1 -  6)it 
bt+i —
Similarly as before, whenever qt > 1, then et = 6it, n\+l =  (1 — </>)(! — 5)nt +  (1 —
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9)it and 6*+1 =  0. Taking this into account, and substituting it out of expression (2.2) 
we get:
ct +  Q S t+i +  Tt = rtnt +  {fat +  (1 -  <j>)qf]{l ~  S)nt +  bt ,
where
r  _  1  ~
Qt  ~  1 - 6  '
Given logarithmic preferences, consumption is equal to a fraction (1 — /3) of wealth:
c\ = (! ~  P) { W t  +  [<fat +  (1 -  1 -  $)nt + b t -  t\} , (2.33)
and investment will be equal to:
. _  [rtnt +  (f)qt(l -  S)nt + bt -  r{] -  c\
lt 1 -  0qt
/3 [rtnt +  H t{  1 ~  S)nt + bt -  r{] -  (1 -  /3)(1 -  1 -  (i)nf
1 -
The saving entrepreneur, on the other hand, is subject to the following constraints:
n ’t + 1 >  (1 -  <fi)( 1 -  <5)n(
bt+i > 0.
As before, entrepreneurs that do not have an investment opportunity face again two 
choices: a consumption/savings choice, and a portfolio choice. As before, their con­
sumption every period will be equal to a fraction (1 — /?) of wealth, and hence be equal 
to:
cst = (1 — (5) [rtnt +  qt( 1 -  S)nt + bt -  r st] (2.35)
Their first order conditions with regards to the choice of entrepreneurial equity and
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government debt holdings are respectively:
u'(ci) = «E t [ u ’(4+1)rt+1 +  [^ i+1 +  (* ~  * )q& 1(1 ~  f t } (2.36)
+(1 - n)E,  { , ' W+1) ^  +  ^ ( 1 - ^ } (2.37)
and
“ 'W ) =  Et {(1 +  rf+1) [ttu' ( c; + 1 ) +  (1 -  tt) u ' ( c(s+ 1 )] } (2.38)
2.5.1 General Equilibrium with Stochastic Liquidity of Equity
The aggregate resource constraint for this economy is now:
r?aatK? +  - r ~ —g B  -  [ tt t \  +  (1 -  7T) r st +  T?]1 +  ri
=  I t +  (1 -  P) {rtK t +  [(1 -  tt +  7x<j))qt +  7r(l -  <t>)q?]{ 1 -  6 ) K t +  B t -  [7tt\ +  (1 -  7r)rj] }
where It = K t+\ — (1 — S)K t .The expression for investment is:
r _  tr{(l[rtK t +  ^ ( 1  -  S)Kt +  B t -  rj] -  (1 -  0)(1 -  <t>)q* (1 -  *)* ,}  „  _i t _  ------------------------------------------------  -^-------------------------------------------------  (Z.4UJ
1 -  Qqt
Finally, the expression for aggregate portfolio choices of the saving entrepreneurs
is:
( W ) M  [rl+1 +  ^ l ( l - 5 ) ] ^ 1 +  B m  )  (2-41)
(1 +  'f+ i) -  [r m  +  [Ht+ 1 +  (1 -  0 )9m ](l -  S)]/<lt \nE t { lrt+i + [<l>qt+1 + (1 — <t>)q?+i](l — fi)\N{+1 + J
Proofs for existence and uniqueness of a competitive equilibrium in the neighbor-
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hood of the steady state are contained in the appendix.
2.5.2 Crowding-in versus crowding-out - Comparative Statics with 
Limited Liquidity of Equity
When we add limited liquidity of equity, the steady state equilibrium conditions 
become:
a a K a H - — B  — \itt1 +  ( 1  — 7r ) r s +  t w] ( 2 .4 2 ^1 +  r 5  L V '  J
=  8K  + ( 1 —0) {a a K a +  [(1 — 7r +  ir(j))q +  7r(l — (j))qR\( 1 — 8)K  +  B  — [•n r 1 +  (1 — 7r)rs] }
(1 -0 q )8 K  = ^{0[aaK a+ ^ q ( l-8 )K + B -T i] - ( l - 0 ) ( \ - ( l ) ) q R( l-8 )K } + (w  -  r w)
(2.43)
( l  _  1 +  g ( l  -  «5)]/g -  (1 +  T-g)
V 1 [cmKo-1 + q ( l  -  6)]rK + B -  t s K ' ’
_  (1 +  r9) -  [ttffl^ -1 +  [<j>q + (1 -  4>)gR]( 1 — 8)\/q
[aaKa~l + [<fiq + (1 — (f>)qR\(l  — <5)]T +  B  — r l
where T = (1 — 7r)(l — 5) +  07r(l — 8) +  08,and qR = (1 — 0q)/( 1 — 0). (2.42)
is the aggregate resource constraint, (2.43) is the aggregate investment equation, and
finally (2.44) is the aggregate portfolio equation. Proposition 2.1 can now be extended 
as follows:
Proposition 2.2 When the redistributive effects o f  government debt variations are ig­
nored, the effects o f variations in government debt on aggregate investment in the steady
12
state are monotonic. In particular, the crowding-in(out) effect dominates the crowding- 
out(in) effect for (1) low(high) values o f 9 (borrowing constraints are tight (loose)), and 
(2) low (high) values o f  0 (equity has a limited(ample) liquidity).
Proof of this proposition in the appendix.
■
2.6 Dynamics
We now introduce aggregate uncertainty in the economy to analyze the conse­
quences of the liquidity-related financial frictions studied in this model for two issues: 
for asset pricing and for the response of aggregate investment and output to technol­
ogy and liquidity shocks. The main question is which (if any) of the novel elements 
of the economy analyzed are relevant for bringing us closer to matching certain impor­
tant asset pricing empirical regularities, and also for bringing us closer to matching the 
response to shocks of both real and financial variables.
The model is calibrated as follows. The length of a period is a quarter, and all pa­
rameters are calibrated to U.S. post-war data.7 With regards to preference parameters, 
the rate of time preference (3 = 0.99 as is standard in the literature, and the degree of 
relative risk aversion for entrepreneurs is constant and set at unity given our assump­
tion of log-utility. Workers’ preference parameters are all subsumed in the total factor 
productivity at, given our assumption that workers consume all of their wage income, 
and at is set to match an average return on equity of 6.98% (data from Alvarez and Jer- 
mann (2001)). Out of the remaining technology parameters, depreciation rate 5 is set at 
a quarterly rate of 2.5%, and the capital share of output, a  is set at 36%. The relative 
size of investing entrepreneurs as a share of the total population of entrepreneurs, n,
7In the different comparative exercises in which some o f  these parameters are varied, all other para­
meters that are set to match a target are also adjusted to keep matching that target.
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is set to match the average rate of investment to GDP (excluding government expendi­
tures) of 25% (data from Uhlig (2006)). The aggregate supply of government bonds B  
is set to match the average value of US Treasury securities held by the US public as a 
share of GDP (38%, obtained from Gomes and Michaelides (2008) in data taken from 
the Congressional Budget Office). Regarding taxes, entrepreneurs pay a 35% tax rate 
on their returns from government debt, while workers pay the residual to balance the 
government budget. The parameters relating to financial imperfections are calibrated as 
follows. The borrowing constraint 6 is set to match the average ratio of capital market 
capitalization to GDP of 1.3 between 1970 and 2001 (Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001)). 
The calibration of the liquidity of corporate equity is not straightforward. For lack of 
a better option, I set at around </> «  0.5 to loosely match the fraction of illiquid equity 
in the economy, given that in the U.S. about half of private investment and employment 
is associated to privately owned firms. Under the assumption that one would purchase 
a perfectly diversified portfolio of the entire private sector, this would roughly translate 
into a degree of liquidity of about one-half. In any event, in the numerical exercises 
I check that this choice of parameter value is not crucial for any particular result, and 
where it is I indicate it. Finally, the source of aggregate uncertainty in this economy, the 
productivity process, is parameterized as p =  0.95 and o 2 chosen to match the volatility 
of aggregate output in the data, where the stochastic process is
log (zt) = p\og(zt-i) +Et 
et ~  N {O,0-2).
It is important to note at the outset that the aim of the model is not to replicate the 
moments of the main real macroeconomic aggregates; certain assumptions in the model 
introduced for tractability make that objective infeasible, in particular the assumption
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of log utility. The model performs particularly poorly with respect to real variables, 
as is evident in figure (2.10).8 The aim instead is twofold: to study what features of 
our economy (in particular, what features related to liquidity) can bring us closer to 
resolving some of the main ongoing asset pricing puzzles, and secondly to analyze 
qualitatively how the novel features introduced in our model alter how the investment 
and output respond to productivity and liquidity shocks.
2.6.1 Asset Pricing Implications
Most of the existing literature on asset pricing, starting with Sharpe (1964), Lintner 
(1965) or Lucas (1978), is based on the role of consumers’ degree of risk aversion 
and time preference in accounting for asset pricing regularities. A number of well 
documented puzzles have been raised in this literature, the most prominent of them 
being the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott (1985)) and the risk-free rate 
puzzle (Aiyagari and Gertler (1991)).9
Few papers in the literature have explored the asset pricing implications of production- 
based models. Some notable exceptions are Cochrane (1991) and (1996), who shows 
that such a model can fit the data better than a standard consumption-based model. His 
model however assumes complete markets, unlike this one, and hence does not study 
issues of liquidity. A more recent contribution is Jermann (2008), whose analysis is 
similar to Cochrane’s except that his attempt is at explaining the equity premium in 
particular. In short, while the main focus of these papers has been on the role of techno­
logical factors in explaining asset prices, the objective of this paper is to study the role 
of producer-related financial frictions. Other closely related contributions in this aspect
8 It is important not to forget that part o f  the source o f  this inability to match certain moments o f  real 
aggregate variables may be in the fact that the only source o f  shocks in this model are technological 
shocks. Their role, particularly that o f  negative productivity shocks, has been questioned in the literature.
9The equity premium and risk-free rate puzzles state that reasonably parameterized versions o f  the 
intertemporal consumption-based asset pricing model produce, respectively, too small risk premia, and 
too large risk-free rates.
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Variable Moment
Model 1 
(DebtlGDP = 113)
Model 2 
(DebtlGDP = 213)
Model 3 
(DebtlGDP = 1) Data
Risk Free Rate Mean -2.46% 2.07% 3.09% 1.58%
Std Dev (5.20%) (12.08%) (7.94%) (5.33%)
Equity Return Mean 5.83% 8.83% 9.66% 8.31%
Std Dev (2.04%) (2.54%) (2.20%) (19.81%)
Equity Premium Mean 8.29% 6.75% 6.58% 6.74%
Std Dev (0.98%) (1.08%) (1.09%)
Sharpe Ratio 4.06 2.66 2.99 0.34
Table 2.1: Asset Pricing Implications of Variations in the Debt-to-GDP ratio (Source 
for empirical data for U.S.: Campbell (1999) and Alvarez and Jermann (2001)).
are Gomes, Yaron, and Zhang (2006) and Holmstrom and Tirole (2001). The former is 
an empirical study of the significance of factors related to financial constraints in ex­
plaining the cross-section of equity returns. The latter is a theoretical study that tries to 
bridge the gap between corporate finance and asset pricing.
Before getting into the comparative exercises, it is worth noting how both the equity 
premium and the risk free rate are easily matched in a production-based model such as 
the one presented in this paper (this can be seen in tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3). Addition­
ally, it does so without having to rely on high values of entrepreneurial risk aversion 
(throughout all these exercises the degree of relative risk aversion is 1). Certain asset 
pricing regularities may remain puzzling with respect to the consumption-based litera­
ture, but not so with respect to the production-based framework.
I conduct some numerical exercises to assess the importance of three financial fac­
tors in influencing the first and second moments of the risk-free rate, the equity return, 
and the equity premium, as well as the Sharpe ratio. First, I study the effect of the 
amount of government debt as a share of GDP. In the U.S., this ratio has fluctuated be­
tween 1/3 and 1 during the post-war period, and I study the asset pricing implications 
of ratios of 1/3, 2/3 and 1. The results are on table (2.1). As expected, increases in the
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Variable Moment
Model 1 (low 
liquidity)
Model 2 (medium 
liquidity)
Model 3 (high 
liquidity) Data
Risk Free Rate Mean -3.01% 2.07% 3.97% 1.58%
Std Dev (11.75%) (11.07%) (4.48%) (5.33%)
Equity Return Mean 6.51% 8.82% 10.09% 8.31%
Std Dev (4.15%) (2.31%) (1.59%) (19.81%)
Equity Premium Mean 9.52% 6.75% 6.12% 6.74%
Std Dev (1.42%) (1.08%) (0.97%)
Sharpe Ratio 2.29 2.93 3.84 0.34
Table 2.2: Asset Pricing Implications of Variations in the liquidity of corporate equity 
(Source for empirical data for U.S.: Campbell (1999) and Alvarez and Jermann (2001)).
debt-to-GDP ratio increase the rate of return on government securities. They also raise 
the required rate of return on equity by depressing equity prices, which is the essence of 
the crowding-out effect. Empirically observed risk free rates, equity returns and equity 
premia are obtained for debt to equity ratios of about 2/3. It is interesting to note how 
the equity premium decreases with government debt. For low values of debt-to-GDP, 
the premium reaches over 8%, and this can be ascribed to two factors. On the one hand, 
scarce government debt carries a large premium. On top of that, the negative liquidity 
properties of equity (its relative illiquidity and its procyclical value) become more of an 
issue when other sources of liquidity are scarce.
Recent empirical work has documented a decline in the U.S. equity premium. Given 
this result on the relationship between government debt and the equity premium, it 
would be interesting to study what fraction of that decrease can be accounted for by 
the smaller debt-to-GDP ratios seen in recent years as compared to the whole post­
war period. Table 2.4 shows data on the U.S. equity premium from Jagannathan et al. 
(2000), which contrasted with data for public debt as a share of GDP seems to suggest 
a pattern of high debt ratios and low equity premia (1980s and 1990s), and vice versa 
(1960s and 1970s).
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Variable Moment
Model 1 (Theta 
Low)
Model 2 (Theta 
Medium)
Model 3 (Theta 
High) Data
Risk Free Rate Mean -6.10% 2.07% 11.04% 1.58%
Std Dev (6.37%) (12.08%) (1.64%) (5.33%)
Equity Return Mean 3.78% 8.83% 16.01% 8.31%
Std Dev (7.92%) (2.54%) (1.19%) (19.81%)
Equity Premium Mean 9.87% 6.75% 4.97% 6.74%
Std Dev (1.31%) (1.08%) (0.66%)
Sharpe Ratio 1.25 2.66 4.17 0.34
Table 2.3: Asset Pricing Implications of Variations in the pledgeability of returns 
(Source for empirical data for U.S.: Campbell (1999) and Alvarez and Jermann (2001)).
The second moments show some disparity with their empirical counterparts, how­
ever (this translates into Sharpe ratios which are of an order of magnitude off the em­
pirical values). A proper investigation of this issue calls for an appropriate treatment 
of the source of aggregate and idiosyncratic fluctuations, which is not the object of this 
paper.
Turning now to the effect of the degree of liquidity of equity, 0, it is clear from table 
2.2 that the effects on all rates of return are significant. The risk free rate varies consid­
erably, as is expected. Relatively illiquid equity makes the economy more dependable 
on outside liquidity, and hence introduces a strong premium on government debt. The 
effect on the equity premium is also considerable. Illiquid equity carries a very high 
premium, as it has to compensate its holders not only for its return risk but also for its 
poor use as a hedge against liquidity shortages. Finally, variations in theta also have 
important consequences for asset pricing. A low borrowing capacity (low 0) has two 
implications: on the one hand, investing entrepreneurs are more liquidity constrained, 
and thus demand ex-ante more liquidity reserves, and on the other, the supply of inside 
liquidity (equity) is smaller. Both these effects cause the equity premium and the risk 
free rate to rise sharply the tighter the borrowing constraints are.
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2 .6 .2  R e s p o n s e  to  P r o d u c t iv i t y  a n d  L iq u id i t y  S h o c k s
To explore the dynamics implied by the model we plot below the impulse responses 
of key macroeconomic variables to productivity and liquidity shocks in versions of the 
model where the level of debt-to-GDP and the degree of financial constraints are varied. 
The stochastic process for liquidity is assumed to be orthogonal to the productivity 
process to be able to identify the different results more clearly. A more in-depth study 
of liquidity shocks however should recognize the dependence between those shocks and 
productivity shocks (over and above the endogenous dependence generated between 
productivity and the supply of liquidity in the context of this model).
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Figure 2.3: Impulse Response of Key Variables to Productivity Shock - Analysis for 
Different Levels of Government Debt (periods = quarters). Responses are the percent­
age deviation of a variable from its steady-state value.
The responses to a productivity shock are captured in figures (2.3) and (2.4), for 
different values of the debt-to-GDP ratio and 6. Lower values of debt-to-GDP make
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the response on impact of investment and output slightly higher than for higher val­
ues, although the difference is not large. Firms rely to a greater extent on equity for 
self-insurance, the supply of which endogenously co-moves with the cycle and acts to 
amplify the effect of shocks. This effect is mirrored in the financial variables. When 
public liquidity supply is large, the risk free rate rises sharply on impact; additional 
private liquidity as a result of higher equity prices on top of an already large supply 
of public liquidity makes saving firms require an even larger return on their holdings 
of government debt. But a positive productivity shock also increases the demand for 
liquidity from saving entrepreneurs as the expected future returns to investing increase. 
This second effect seems to dominate when the level of public debt is low, and the risk 
free rate does not increase on impact.
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Figure 2.4: Impulse Response of Key Variables to Productivity Shock - Analysis for 
Different Levels of Financing Constraints (periods = quarters). Responses are the per­
centage deviation of a variable from its steady-state value.
With respect to the cyclical behaviour of the equity premium, empirical research
8 0
has documented that risk premia are counter-cyclical (recent examples are Campbell 
and Cochrane (1999), Lochstoer (2006)). The consumption-based literature has tried 
to explain this feature through a number of ways. Constantinides and Duffie (1996) 
explain the countercyclicality because equity provides a bad hedge against a job loss 
during a recession, and hence investors require a premium during bad times for holding 
equity. Other papers use particular assumptions on preference characterizations that re­
sult in countercyclical coefficients of risk aversion (see Pijoan-Mas (2007)). The model 
introduced in this paper introduces a new explanation for the countercyclicality of the 
equity premium. Following a positive shock to technology, that is anticipated by agents 
to be persistent and to result in higher collateral values in the near future and hence less 
severe credit constraints, firms adjust the risk profile of their liquid portfolio to include 
a higher share of riskier but more profitable equities, in detriment of government liq­
uidity. The opposite happens in downturns; firms anticipate that credit constraints have 
a higher probability of being tight in the near future and shift their preference towards a 
safer profile of their portfolio. In essence, equities provide a bad hedge against the risk 
of having an investment opportunity and being liquidity constrained in a downturn, and 
hence agents holding equities require a higher premium in downturns. This result has 
a similar flavour to the result on cyclical variations in the composition of investment of 
credit constrained firms in Perez (2008).
I also study the effect of liquidity shocks, and the results are in figure (2.5). These 
show that positive shocks to the liquidity of firms’ equity raise investment and output to 
a significantly greater extent in economies with limited publicly supplied liquidity. The 
effect is captured as well in the reaction of the rate of return on government bonds. On 
impact, they rise sharply, reflecting a decrease in the liquidity premium they were previ­
ously enjoying given that the liquidity differential now between equity and government 
debt has been reduced.
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2.7 Conclusion
This paper has highlighted how the availability of government supplied liquidity 
influences the creation of private liquidity in the form of claims to the future returns of 
firms’ investment, and the conditions under which variations in the level of government 
debt may affect aggregate private investment positively or negatively. This analysis, and 
others like it, should be taken into account when evaluating the effects of episodes such 
as the significant deficits of the two George W. Bush terms (2000-2004, 2004-2008). 
In particular, the effects identified in this paper, such as the potentially beneficial role 
these increased deficits may have had in supplying additional liquidity to the corporate 
sector, the crowding out of private investment, or the redistributive effects, have to be 
weighed in with other consequences of these net increases in government spending.
The results concerning the asset pricing properties of production-based models fea­
8 2
turing financially constrained firms are promising. This framework provides interesting 
results in terms of matching the main empirical regularities, and in particular in terms 
of which elements related to liquidity are of most importance to achieving that success. 
Further work needs to be done in order to match the second moments of asset prices 
better, and as a first step, identifying better which sources of shocks matter most for 
asset pricing is a promising avenue.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Debt-to-GDP and Equity Premium data
The past decades have seen the fiscal positions of many countries improve, a trend 
that has been however reversed for some countries (most notable the U.S.). Below is a 
chart for the debt-to-GDP ratio for the U.S. for most of the post-war era. On the other 
hand, a strand of the empirical asset pricing literature has debated recently whether the 
equity premium has been secularly declining in recent times. Jagannathan et al. (2000) 
document significant variation in their measure of the equity premium during the past 
four decades, as is clear in Table 2.4.
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Figure 2.6: Gross National Public Debt as % of GDP for the United States. (Source: 
Office of Management and Budget, White House, 2008)
2.A.2 Existence and Uniqueness
The equilibrium steady state solution can be obtained by solving for K , r  and q in 
(2.20), (2.22) and (2.23). In order to prove existence and uniqueness I make the same 
mild simplifying assumptions which are stated in section 2.4.1 in relation to Proposition
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Equity
Period Premium
Public 
Debt I 
GDP
1960-1969
1970-1979
1980-1989
1990-1999
5.23%
3.30%
0.94%
1.90%
38.9%
25.6%
40.0%
62.9%
Table 2.4: The Equity Premium and the Gross National Public Debt as percent of GDP 
for the United States. (Source: Jagannathan et al. (2000) for the equity premium and 
Office of Management and Budget, White House, 2008)
1. Taking these into account, we can solve for K  and q in (2.27) and (2.28). After re­
arranging, they become respectively:
(2.45)
7 i *  +  72* “ + 739* + 74 =  0 (2.46)
where
(5aa
2
7i
ftaa
72 2
PB
74 2
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Substituting q  out of (2.46) leaves us with
+  ( 7 2 - 7 3 ^ V “ + ( 7 4 - 7 3 ^ )  = 0 -
P i ' P i
Without loss of generality, assume a  = 1/2, make the change of variables K  =  x2, 
and solve the resulting quadratic equation to get
\[K  = P i \  .  (  P z72 -  73 -3-  -  47 i 74 -  73^ -
'P1
1
W i
X i  ±  \ / x  1 + X 2
P i
where
Xi =  -  7 2 -  7 3
A
X2
P i ) '
471 (7* - 7al)  •
Existence
There are two possible solutions, and for there to exist at least one, it is necessary 
that the term inside the square root is positive, or
Xi +  X2 > (2.47)
and also that at least the largest of the two solutions is positive:
max { 2 7  ^ (Xl + / x*+X2) ’ 2 7 ^ (Xl _ / Xi +X2) } -  °’ (2-48)
Given that nf1 =  (1 — +  ^ > 0, condition (2.48) simplifies to
Xl +  y jx  1 + X 2 >  0- 
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Condition (2.47) implies that
( 7 2 - 7 s| )  - * h ( 7 < - 7 , ^ ) > 0 .
Uniqueness
Conditional on existence of an equilibrium, uniqueness requires that the smallest of 
the two solutions is strictly negative. Again, given that 'y1 = (1 — J > 0,
uniqueness is guaranteed when:
Xi -  y x i  + X2 < 0-
2.A.3 Condition for q >  1
From appendix 2.A.2 we know that:
K  = 
Q =
2^~ ^Xi +  y jx i +  X2
74 +  7 iA  +  7 2A a 
7 3 ^
(2.49)
(2.50)
From (2.50) we can obtain the parameter restriction that ensures that q > 1 in the 
neighbourhood of the steady state when all taxes are levied on workers, and a = 1/2.
2.A.4 Proof of Proposition 1
Once again, we focus on the case in which we abstract from the intersectorial 
redistributive effect by levying all taxes on the entrepreneurial sector.
In appendix (2. A.2) we show that the unique steady state solution to the equilibrium
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conditions is
where
K  =
27i  (Xl + ^ X1 + X 2
Xi =  -  72 “  73
M  
P i ) '
X2 =  —47i I 74 -  7 3 ^  J  ■
We want to analyze how the steady state level of capital varies with the amount of 
government debt, or
dK
sign  1 J =  sign
2^7 (*i +  V x i  +  X2)]  |
dB
(2.51)
Given that
dx  1 
dB =  0 ,
and that X2 is a linear function of B, then we can simplify (2.51) to
sign  =  slSn {X2} . (2.52)
where
X2 =  4 7i f —7 4  +  7s ^
Given that /y1 = (1 — +  & > 0, and /^  =  1 — f  (1 — £) > 0, then
(2.53)
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where
~ P i l i  + 73ft = P
( 1 - 5 )
{
(1 - /5 ) 1 — 0 + /50 + 05} [(1 - /? )  +  !]■ (2.54)
The first term in the right-hand side of (2.54) is always positive and is not a function 
of either 0 or 0, while the second term is always negative and is a negative function of 
both 0 or 0. Remembering that 0 <  0 <  1 and 0 < 0 < 1, for 0 =  0 =  0, d K /d B  > 0 
and the crowding-in effect dominates. For 0 = 1 and 0 <  0 < 1, d K /d B  = — 0 0  and 
the crowding-out effect dominates. Call 0* the level at which both effects balance out 
when 0 =  0. For 0 = 1  and 0 = 0, sign(dK/ dB) =  sign {S} > 0, but there exists 0** 
that satisfies 0 < 0** < 0* such that for 0 =  1 and 0 > 0**, sign (dK /dB ) < 0.
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Figure 2.7: Effect of Variations in the Ratio of Debt to GDP on the Level of Capital, 
for Different Levels of Financial Constraints, when all Taxes are Paid for by Saving 
Entrepreneurs (i.e. when not taking into account the inter-sectorial distributive effects).
10
P h i = 0 .49
8 Phi = 0.3
5 7
wO 6
<B
S 5
P h i = 0 .2
V)
P h i = 0.1
$  4
<0
®  3
V) 2
1
0,0 0.2 0 4 0.6
Steady State Debt over GDP
0.8
Figure 2.8: Effect of Variations in the Ratio of Debt to GDP on the Level of Capital, for 
Different Levels of Liquidity, when all Taxes are Paid for by Workers (i.e. when taking 
into account the inter-sectorial distributive effects).
2 .A .6  C o m p u t a t io n a l  P r o c e d u r e  fo r  S e c t io n  5  -  D y n a m ic s
The dynamic model is solved by performing a quadratic approximation of the deci­
sion rules using a perturbation approach as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004). Below 
are the policy and transition functions in the baseline calibration.
9 0
Investment kkWth
Rislfee
Rat
§ity
femium Output
Q’ty
Re
Constant 9.7763 31.1214 0.5172 -0.5172 11.4172 0.6767
k (-1) 0.0789 0.7361 -0.0069 0.0072 0.1752 -0.0009
z (-1) 11.4234 11.3092 0.3377 -0.3593 10.8463 0.0930
e 12.0247 11.9044 0.3555 -0.3782 11.4172 0.0979
k (-1)'k (-1) -0.0012 -0.0012 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0013 0.0000
z (-1) 0.1742 0.1724 -0.0028 0.0027 0.1664 0.0002
z (-1).* (-1) -0.7817 -0.7739 -0.0431 0.0589 -0.2712 -0.0692
e,e 5.4627 5.4080 0.1393 -0.1337 5.7086 -0.0252
k (-1).e 0.1833 0.1815 -0.0030 0.0028 0.1752 0.0002
z <-v* 10.3790 10.2753 0.2647 -0.2541 10.8463 -0.0479
Figure 2.9: Policy and Transition Functions in Baseline Calibration
Model Data
Variable
Standard 
Deviation 
(as %)
S td  Dev 1 
Std  Dev 
Output
Standard 
Deviation 
(as %)
Std Dev 1 
Std Dev 
Output
Consumption 1.68 0.79 0.82 0.38
Investment 3.41 1.60 8.07 3.79
Real wage 2.17 1.02 0.89 0.42
Output 2.12 1.00 2.13 1.00
Figure 2.10: Moments of Real Macroeconomic Variables in the Data and in the Baseline 
Calibration of the Model. (Data from Uhlig (2006)).
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Chapter 3 
Financial Innovation, Macroeconomic 
Stability and Systemic Crises
3.1 Introduction
"When [financial] innovation ... takes place in a period o f generally 
favorable economic and financial conditions, we are necessarily left with 
more uncertainty about how exposures will evolve and markets will function 
in less favorable circumstances. The past several years o f exceptionally 
rapid growth in credit derivatives and the larger role played by nonbank 
financial institutions, including hedge funds, has occurred in a context o f  
... relatively strong and significantly more stable economic growth, less 
concern about the level and volatility in future inflation, and low expected 
volatility in many asset prices. Even i f  a substantial part o f these changes 
prove durable, we know less about how these markets will function in con­
ditions o f stress..." (Geithner, 2006)
Systemic financial crises often occur when investment booms and rapid credit ex­
pansions collapse because the expectations of high future returns that drove them are not
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fulfilled (Borio and Lowe, 2002; Eichengreen and Mitchener, 2003). But while invest­
ment booms and busts have been an important part of recent financial crises in emerg­
ing market economies, their impact on financial stability in the advanced economies 
has been less marked. Greater macroeconomic stability and the growing sophistica­
tion of financial intermediation appear to have reduced the incidence of crisis. Increas­
ingly, however, policymakers have become concerned that while these factors may have 
helped to reduce the likelihood of systemic crises, their impact, should one occur, could 
be on a significantly larger scale than hitherto (see, for example, Raj an, 2005, Tucker, 
2005, and Gieve, 2006).1
It is difficult to make judgments on such issues without formally modelling the un­
derlying externalities associated with systemic financial crises. One strand of the litera­
ture (e.g. Aghion et al., 1999; Aghion et al., 2001) draws on Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) 
to highlight credit frictions arising from enforcement problems.2 These papers illustrate 
how endogenous balance sheet constraints, and financial development more generally, 
contribute to financial instability. But since these papers do not permit state-contingent 
financial contracts, the extent to which the underlying externality drives their results is 
unclear. By contrast, in existing models with state-contingent contracts (e.g. Kehoe 
and Levine, 1993; Krishnamurthy, 2003; Lorenzoni, 2005; Gai et al., 2006), investment 
projects are never abandoned and crises never occur. Moreover, these papers do not 
consider the effects of financial innovation or changes in macroeconomic volatility.
This paper seeks to bridge this gap. We develop a general equilibrium model of 
intermediation with financial constraints and state-contingent contracts. Systemic fi­
nancial crises are generated through a clearly defined pecuniary externality associated 
with asset ‘fire sales’ during periods of stress. Moreover, the potential for instability is
1 Gai et al. (2007) discuss the implications o f  these issues for risk assessment work at the Bank o f  
England.
2An alternative strand o f  the literature highlights coordination problems amongst financial market 
participants as the key externality driving financial crises. See, for example, Diamond and Dybvig (1983), 
Obstfeld (1996), and Morris and Shin (1998).
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present ex ante and does not rely on sunspots or other undefined factors external to the 
model.
In our setup, consumers channel funds through collateral-constrained financial in­
termediaries to firms operating in more-productive sectors of the economy. Firms man­
age investment projects but intermediaries retain financial control over them. Even 
though financial contracts can be made contingent on the aggregate state, enforcement 
problems mean that insurance opportunities for intermediaries are limited. As a result, 
adverse aggregate shocks to the productive sectors of the economy may force interme­
diaries to sell capital to less-productive sectors to remain solvent. In the spirit of Fisher 
(1933) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992), this distress selling is associated with reduced 
asset prices.3 In turn, this creates a feedback to net worth which affects the balance 
sheets of all intermediaries, potentially leading to further asset sales. Since interme­
diaries do not internalise the effect on asset prices of their own sales, the competitive 
equilibrium is constrained inefficient. In extreme cases, it is this externality which can 
result in a systemic financial crisis that may be self-fulfilling.
The analysis points to a range of possible outcomes. Since expected future returns 
in productive sectors are high, initial investment is always strong and associated with a 
large credit expansion. Provided that there is no adverse shock, investment and credit 
growth remain robust, and there are no asset sales. For mild negative shocks, firms 
and intermediaries liquidate some of their assets. However, since intermediaries remain 
solvent and firms continue to operate in productive sectors, this outcome can be viewed 
as a ‘recession’ rather than a systemic crisis.
For more severe shocks, multiple equilibria can arise, with (ex ante) beliefs deter­
mining the actual equilibrium which results. Multiplicity can occur in bad states be­
cause the supply of capital by intermediaries during fire sales is downward sloping in
3 In a study o f  commercial aircraft transactions, Pul vino (1998) finds evidence for this type o f  fire sale 
effect; Coval and Stafford’s (2007) analysis o f  mutual fund asset sales demonstrates that these effects 
may be present even in highly liquid markets.
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price, since the lower the price, the more capital they will have to sell to remain solvent. 
If agents have ‘optimistic’ beliefs about how the economy will evolve under stress, there 
will only be a partial liquidation of assets, as in the ‘recession’ case. But if beliefs are 
‘pessimistic’, a systemic financial crisis occurs. Moreover, for extremely severe shocks, 
a crisis is inevitable, regardless of beliefs. Under this scenario, asset prices are driven 
down to such an extent that all intermediaries and firms are forced to liquidate all of 
their assets -  a full-blown financial crisis occurs, intermediaries shut down, and the clo­
sure of firms means that there are no investment opportunities in the more-productive 
sectors of the economy.
The financial system has been changing rapidly in recent years. Intermediation is in­
creasingly conducted through non-bank intermediaries such as private equity firms and 
hedge funds, who typically have higher leverage in risk-adjusted terms than traditional 
banks. Resale markets for capital have deepened, and sophisticated financial products 
and contracts, such as credit derivatives and asset-backed securities, have mushroomed 
(White, 2004; Allen and Gale, 2007; Plantin et a l , 2007). Our model suggests that 
these developments may have made economies less vulnerable to crises as they widen 
access to liquidity and allow assets to be traded more easily during periods of stress. 
But, by relaxing financial constraints facing borrowers, they imply that, should a crisis 
occur, its impact could be more severe than previously.
We demonstrate how these effects may be reinforced by greater macroeconomic 
stability.4 Our model predicts that mean preserving reductions in volatility make crises 
less likely since severe shocks occur less frequently. However, greater stability also 
makes ‘recession’ states less likely. As a result, consumers are more willing to lend, 
allowing intermediaries to increase their borrowing and initial investment. But, if a 
crisis does then ensue, losses will be greater. Overall, our findings thus make clear 
how financial innovation and increased macroeconomic stability may serve to reduce
4A range o f  empirical studies (e.g. Benati, 2004; Stock and Watson, 2005) find that output and 
inflation volatility have fallen in many developed countries in recent years.
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the likelihood of crises in developed countries, but increase their potential impact.
Our paper has several points of contact with the literature. The model has some sim­
ilarities to Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) and Jermann and Quadrini (2006), and builds 
on Lorenzoni’s (2005) analysis of lending under endogenous financial constraints and 
asset prices. It differs in two key respects. First, we show how multiple equilibria and 
systemic crises can arise in such a model. Second, we capture some of the key features 
of intermediation in the modem financial system: though our model also applies to tra­
ditional banks, it is especially relevant to the activities of hedge funds, private equity 
firms, and other non-bank financial institutions. These developments allow us to model 
the effects of financial innovation and greater macroeconomic stability on the likelihood 
and potential scale of systemic crises.
In recent work, Allen and Carletti (2006) also assess the systemic effects of financial 
innovation. But they have a specific focus on credit risk transfer between banks and 
insurance companies, and on how its effects differ according to the type of liquidity 
risk that banks face. In particular, their model highlights how, in some circumstances, 
credit risk transfer can create the potential for contagion from the insurance sector to 
the banking sector, and thus be detrimental. By contrast, we consider the more general 
consequences of financial innovation through its broader impact on financial constraints 
and the depth of resale markets.5
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents the basic structure 
of the model, while section 3.3 solves for equilibrium and discusses how multiplicity 
and systemic financial crises arise. Section 3.4 considers the effects of financial inno­
vation and changes in macroeconomic volatility on the likelihood and potential scale of
financial crises. A final section concludes.
f in a n c ia l innovation may also increase uncertainty about the behaviour o f  financial markets. We 
leave this issue aside and just focus on capturing the effects o f  certain trends linked to financial innova­
tion.
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3.2 The Model
The economy evolves over three periods (t = 0,1,2) and has two goods, a con­
sumption good and a capital good. Consumption goods can always be transformed one 
for one into capital goods, but not vice versa. Because of the irreversibility of invest­
ment, the price of the capital good in terms of the consumption good (the asset price), 
q, may be less than one in the event of asset sales -  this is one of the key drivers of our 
results.
3.2.1 Financial Intermediaries and Other Agents
The economy is composed of consumers, financial intermediaries, and firms, with 
large numbers of each type of agent. All agents are risk-neutral and identical within 
their grouping, and there is no discounting.
Consumers aim to maximise total consumption, Co +  c\ +  c2, where q  is consump­
tion in period t. They each receive a large endowment, e, of the consumption good in 
every period. Since they are only able to produce using a relatively unproductive tech­
nology operating in the traditional sector of the economy, they channel funds through 
intermediaries to firms operating in the more-productive sector of the economy.6
Intermediaries in the model are best viewed as operating in the modem financial 
system: they could be interpreted as traditional banks, but our model is also designed 
to apply to the activities of hedge funds, private equity firms, and other non-bank finan­
cial institutions. They borrow from consumers and invest in firms in order to maximise 
total profits, 7To +  tti +  7T2, where profits and consumption goods are assumed to be
6 Although intermediaries clearly have an important role in practice, there is nothing in the structure o f  
our model which precludes consumers from investing directly in firms. We could formally motivate the 
existence o f  intermediaries by, for example, introducing asymmetric information or, more specifically, 
following Diamond and Dybvig (1983) or Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). But this would significantly 
complicate the analysis without changing our main results. Therefore, for simplicity and transparency, 
we simply assume that consumers can only invest in the more-productive sector through intermediaries. 
Indeed, the involvement o f  intermediaries in investment projects in the more-productive sector could be 
interpreted as partially driving the higher returns in that sector relative to the traditional sector.
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interchangeable. However, their wealth is relatively limited: although they receive an 
endowment, no, of the consumption good in period 0 (this may be thought of as their 
initial net worth), this is assumed to be very small relative to e. We also assume that in­
termediaries are unable to trade each other’s equity due to limited commitment, though 
relaxing this assumption does not affect our qualitative results.
Firms have no special role in our setup. They are agents with no net worth who man­
age investment projects in exchange for a negligible payment -  this could be viewed as 
following from perfect competition amongst firms. Since this implies that intermedi­
aries effectively have complete control over investment projects, we abstract from the 
behaviour of firms in all of what follows, and simply view intermediaries as having 
direct access to the productive technology.
The assumption that intermediaries have financial control over firms may appear 
somewhat extreme. But it embeds some of the recent developments in financial mar­
kets in a simple way. In particular, as Plantin et al (2007) stress, the greater use of 
sophisticated financial products such as credit derivatives, and the deepening of resale 
markets for capital have made it easier for intermediaries to trade their assets (i.e. their 
loans / investments in firms). This especially applies to non-traditional financial inter­
mediaries.
3.2.2 Production Opportunities
Figure 3.1 depicts the timing of events. Intermediaries can invest in the productive 
sector in periods 0 and 1. Since there is no depreciation, an investment of io in period 
0 delivers i0 units of capital in period 1. We also suppose it delivers x i0 units of the 
consumption good (profit) in period 1, where a: is a common aggregate shock with 
distribution function H  (x). The realisation of x  is revealed to all agents in period 1, 
depends on the aggregate state, s, and can be contracted upon. Intuitively, the shock 
represents the per unit surplus (positive x) or shortfall (negative x) in period 1 revenue
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relative to (future) operating expenses. Alternatively, a positive x  could be viewed as 
an early return on investment and a negative :r as a restructuring cost or an additional 
capital cost which must be paid to continue with the project. Under both interpretations, 
a negative x  does not need to be paid by anyone if the investment project is abandoned. 
But, when analysing the welfare gains associated with the social planner’s solution, we 
allow for the possibility that an unpaid negative x  imposes a cost to society o fw  = —Xx, 
where 0 < A < 1.
Let E  (x) = fi > 0, so that early investment in period 0 is expected to be profitable. 
If x  turns out to be negative, the intermediary has two options: it can either incur the 
cost xio (possibly by selling a portion of its capital to consumers) and continue with the 
investment project; or it can go into liquidation, abandoning the project and selling all 
of its capital to consumers.7 In the latter case, it receives zero profit in period 2 but does 
not need to pay xio. In what follows, we associate total liquidation by the representative 
intermediary as reflecting a systemic financial crisis.8
In period 1, intermediaries can either sell ks  units of capital to consumers or make 
an additional investment, ii > 0. Therefore, they enter period 2 owning a total capital 
stock of:
ks — Zo ks “f- i\g. (3.1)
Invested in the productive sector, this capital yields A ks units of the consumption good 
in period 2, where A is a constant greater than one.
If consumers acquire capital from intermediaries in period 1, they can also use it to 
produce consumption goods in period 2, but they only have access to a less-productive 
technology operating in the perfectly competitive traditional sector of the economy. In
7 Since intermediaries are homogeneous and unable to trade each other’s equity, there is no scope for 
them to sell capital to each other following a negative aggregate shock.
8A s financial contracts are fully state-contingent in this model (see section 3.2.3), they w ill be spec­
ified so that repayments from intermediaries to consumers are zero in states in which intermediaries are 
solvent but in severe distress. Since this implies that intermediaries never default on their contractual 
liabilities to consumers, it makes sense to associate systemic financial crises with total liquidation.
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t = 1 t = 2
Shock xs is realised (all uncertainty revealed). Intermediaries
• Repay b ?sks to consumers.
Intermediaries
• Repay b j 0 to consumers.
• Either sell k f  capital to consumers or make an 
additional investment of iIs.
• Borrow b:Jcs from constmiers.
• Invest a total of ks = iQ-  kss + ils in project.
Consumers
• If there are fire sales (hss> 0), invest kT= k f  in 
the traditional sector.
Figure 3.1: Timeline of Events
particular, the production function in the traditional sector, F  (kT) , displays decreasing 
returns to scale, with F' (kT) > 0 and F" (kT) < 0. For simplicity, F' (0) =  1, 
implying that there is no production in the traditional sector unless q < 1 (i.e. unless 
intermediaries sell capital in period 1). To aid intuition, we assume the specific form:
F  (kT) = kT (1 -  a kT) , (3.2)
where 2a k T < 1. We also assume that capital used in the traditional sector depreciates 
fully after one period, so that it is worthless in period 2.
The diminishing returns embedded in the production function are designed to cap­
ture the link, highlighted by Shleifer and Vishny (1992), between distress selling of 
capital and reduced asset prices. As they argue, many physical assets (e.g. oil tankers, 
aircraft, copper mines, laboratory equipment etc.) are not easily redeployable, and the 
portfolios of intermediaries, many of which contain exotic tailor-made assets, are sim-
t =  0  
Intermediaries
• Borrow E {b jig from consumers.
• Invest ig in the productive sector 
(project managed by firms).
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ilar in this regard. Therefore, if an aggregate shock hits an entire sector, participants 
in that sector wishing to sell assets may be forced to do so at a substantial discount to 
industry outsiders.
The parameter a  reflects the productivity of second-hand capital. Although this 
partly depends on the underlying productivity of capital in alternative sectors, it also 
captures the effectiveness with which capital is channelled into its most effective use 
when it is sold. As such, it is likely to be decreasing in financial market depth (note 
that a  = 0 corresponds to constant returns to scale in the traditional sector). Since 
increased market participation, greater global mobility of capital, and the development 
of sophisticated financial products may all serve to deepen resale markets, a  is likely to 
have fallen in recent years.
3.2.3 Financial Contracts and Constraints
Intermediaries partially finance investment projects by borrowing. At date 0, they 
offer a state-contingent financial contract to consumers. As shown in the timeline, this 
specifies repayments in state s of bisio in period 1 and b2sks in period 2, and borrowing 
of E  (bi) i0 in period 0 and b2sks in period 1 and state s, where b is the repayment / 
borrowing ratio. Since period 1 repayments to consumers on period 0 lending are state- 
contingent, this has some features of an equity contract. In particular, the contract is 
capable of providing intermediaries with some insurance against aggregate shocks.
Although this contract is fully contingent on the aggregate state, it is subject to 
limited commitment and potential default. This friction is fundamental to the model: 
without it, the competitive equilibrium would be efficient and systemic financial crises 
would never occur. Its significance lies in the borrowing constraints which it imposes 
on financial contracts:
(bu i0 -  b2sks) +  b2sks > 0 Vs, (3.3)
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^2s^s ^  0
buio < Oquio
s^s — @Q2sfcs
Vs, (3.4)
Vs, (3.5)
Vs, (3.6)
where qts is the asset price in period t and state s, and 9 <  1 is the fraction of the asset 
value that can be used as collateral.
The first two constraints, (3.3) and (3.4), reflect limited commitment on the con­
sumer side. In particular, they imply that net future repayments to consumers must be 
non-negative. In other words, regardless of the state, consumers cannot commit to make 
net positive transfers to intermediaries at future dates. Constraint (3.3) relates to net fu­
ture repayments as viewed in period 0 (for which additional intermediary borrowing in 
period 1 must be taken into account); constraint (3.4) relates to future repayments as 
viewed in period 1. These constraints follow from assuming that the future income of 
consumers cannot be seized -  consumers can always default on their financial obliga­
tions.9
The final two constraints, (3.5) and (3.6), specify that intermediaries can only bor­
row up to a fraction, 6, of the value of their assets in each period, where we define 
9 to be the maximum loan-to-value ratio. Jermann and Quadrini (2006, Appendix B) 
present a simple model which motivates constraints such as these. In particular, they 
link an equivalent parameter to 9 to the value of capital recovered upon default relative 
to its original value when held by the borrower, and to the relative bargaining power 
of borrowers and lenders. Importantly, if the recovery rate is less than one, the max­
imum loan-to-value ratio will also be less than one. As argued by Gai et al. (2006), 
recovery rates below one may reflect transaction costs built into the specifics of collat­
9Collectively, it would be in the interests o f  consumers to commit to make net positive transfers to 
intermediaries in certain states at future dates. But such a commitment is not incentive compatible since 
consumers each have an individual incentive to renege ex post. Limited commitment on the consumer side 
can thus also be viewed as stemming from the lack o f  a suitable commitment device amongst consumers.
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eral arrangements, such as dispute resolution procedures. Alternatively, there may be 
human capital loss associated with default.
We regard the maximum loan-to-value ratio as being linked to the level of finan­
cial market development. It seems likely that financial innovation may have increased 
6 in recent years. Deeper resale markets may have reduced the human capital loss as­
sociated with default, and could have enabled sellers of assets seized upon default to 
pass on a larger proportion of the resale transaction costs to buyers than previously.10 
More generally, the greater use of credit derivative and syndicated loan markets may 
have increased recovery rates for lenders. Alternatively, as highlighted by Jermann and 
Quadrini (2006), the development of more sophisticated asset-backed securities may 
have made it easier for borrowers to pledge their assets as collateral to lenders. All of 
these factors may have made investors willing to accept higher loan-to-value ratios, thus 
raising 6.
It is clear that some of these factors relate to the depth of secondary markets. As 
such, increases in 0 may be closely tied to reductions in a. This concurs with broader 
theoretical arguments linking the debt capacity of investors to the liquidity and depth 
of the secondary markets for assets used as collateral for that debt. For example, 
Williamson (1988) and Shleifer and Vishny (1992) discuss how the redeployability of 
assets is a key factor in determining their liquidation value and that this, in turn, af­
fects investors’ debt capacity. More recently, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2006) have 
studied the relationship between the leverage capacity of traders and financial market 
liquidity, demonstrating that they are likely to be positively correlated and, importantly, 
that causality can run both ways.
,0The latter point could potentially be modelled formally in a Nash bargaining framework -  for a 
related model in this spirit, see Duffie et al. (2005).
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3.3 Equilibrium
We now solve for equilibrium, focusing primarily on the competitive outcome. 
Since consumers expect investment in the productive sector of the economy to be prof­
itable, and since they have very large endowments relative to financial intermediaries, 
they always meet the borrowing demands of intermediaries provided that constraints 
(3.3)-(3.6) are satisfied. Meanwhile, as noted above, firms simply manage investment 
projects for a negligible wage. Therefore, we can solve for the competitive equilibrium 
by considering the optimisation problem of the representative intermediary.
3.3.1 The Representative Intermediary’s Optimisation Problem
The representative intermediary’s optimisation problem is given by:
max Eo (ttq +  TTi +  7r2)
subject to:
tto +  qoio = n0 + E  (&i) z0, (3.7)
TTis +  quks — Qisio +  x aio — bisi0 +  b2sks Vs: partial or no liquidation, (3.8)
TTis Qls^ O b\slQ Vs: total liquidation in period 1, (8L)
ir2 s — A ks b2sks Vs: partial or no liquidation, (3.9)
7T2s =  0 Vs: total liquidation in period 1, (9L)
0 <  bu < Oqu Vs, (3.10)
0 <  b2s < 6q2s Vs. (3.11)
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Equation (3.7) represents the intermediary’s period 0 budget constraint: investment 
costs and any profits taken by the intermediary in period 0 must be financed by its 
endowment (initial net worth) and borrowing from consumers.11 In period 1, provided 
that the investment project is continued (i.e. provided that the intermediary does not 
go into total liquidation), the intermediary’s budget constraint is given by (3.8): financ­
ing is provided by start of period assets at their market value (giszo) and net period 1 
borrowing (b2sks — &isz0), adjusted for the revenue surplus or shortfall, x si0. Period 2 
profits in this case are then given by (3.9). By contrast, if the intermediary goes into 
total liquidation in period 1, it sells all of its capital at the market price, yielding qisi0 
in revenue. Therefore, its period 1 profits are given by (8L), while period 2 profits are 
zero (equation (9L)). Finally, note that (3.10) and (3.11) simply represent combined 
and simplified versions of the borrowing constraints, (3.3)-(3.6).
This optimisation problem can immediately be simplified. Since expected returns on 
investment are always high, it is clear that the intermediary will never take any profits 
until period 2 unless it goes into total liquidation.12 Therefore 7r0 =  0 in (3.7) and 
7Tia = 0 for all 5 in (3.8). Moreover, given that the high return between periods 1 and 
2 is certain, intermediaries wish to borrow as much as possible in period 1. So (3.11) 
binds at its upper bound and b2s = 0q2s. Finally, the asset price is only endogenous 
in period 1: q0 = 1 because of the large supply of consumption goods in period 0 and 
we set q2s = 1 for all s .13 Therefore, we can rewrite the intermediary’s optimisation
11 Both this and the other budget constraints must bind by local non-satiation.
12Period 1 profits may be positive if  the intermediary goes into total liquidation because it does not 
need to pay xio  if  it shuts down and can retain any proceeds remaining from asset sales after outstanding 
liabilities have been paid. Note that total profits are still increasing in x; the only difference is that i f  the 
intermediary continues to operate, it takes its (higher) profits in period 2 and nothing in period 1.
13 We set q2s — 1 because w e wish to allow for borrowing between periods 1 and 2 without setting up 
an infinite horizon model. This assumption can be justified by assuming that period 2 returns are realised 
in two stages. In the first stage, the intermediaries must control the capital and (A  — l ) k s units o f  the 
consumption good are realised; in the second stage, k s units are realised irrespective o f  who controls 
the capital. Between these stages, intermediaries must repay consumers with consumption goods and, if  
necessary, a portion o f  their capital -  i f  they do not, their capital w ill be seized. Since everyone can gain 
a return from capital at this point, its marginal value is one, and hence q2s =  1.
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problem as:
max
io,{ks},{&ls)
subject to:
=  ^0 + E ( b i ) i 0,
Q isk s  Qis'io % s i  o  bis'i'Q “ I-  @ks
Kls Qls^O l^s^O
7r2s =  A/cs -  6ks
n 2s = 0
0 < b l s < Qqis
Eo (tti +  7r2)
(3.12)
Vs: partial or no liquidation, (3.13)
Vs: total liquidation in period 1, (8L)
Vs: partial or no liquidation, (3.14)
Vs: total liquidation in period 1, (9L)
Vs. (3.10)
3.3.2 Multiple Equilibria and Systemic Crises: Intuition
Before solving the intermediary’s optimisation problem, we graphically illustrate 
how multiple equilibria and systemic financial crises arise in the model. Faced with a 
negative realisation of x, intermediaries may be forced to sell a portion of their capital to 
the traditional sector in period 1 to remain solvent. In these fire sale states, i \s = 0 and, 
using (3.1), ks =  i0 — A;f =  i0 — k j,  where A;f =  k j  < z0. Provided that intermediaries 
remain solvent, we can substitute this expression into (3.13) and rearrange to obtain the 
inverse supply function for capital in the traditional sector:
(bu - x a - 0 ) i 0 
?i. =  p ---------- 1-0- (315)
From (3.15), it is clear that the supply function is downward sloping and convex. The 
intuition for this is that when the asset price falls, intermediaries are forced to sell more 
capital to the traditional sector to remain solvent; the more the asset price falls, the more 
capital needs to be sold to raise a given amount of liquidity. Equation (3.15) holds for
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all k j  < iQ. But if intermediaries sell all of their capital and go into liquidation, the 
supply of capital to the traditional sector is simply given by:
( kJ)L = i0. (3.16)
Meanwhile, since the traditional sector is perfectly competitive, the inverse demand 
function for capital sold by intermediaries follows directly from (3.2):
q = F' (kT) = 1 - 2  a k T. (3.17)
This function is downward sloping and linear due to linearly decreasing returns to scale 
in the traditional sector. Combining (3.15), (3.16) and (3.17) yields the equilibrium 
asset price(s) in fire sale states.
The supply and demand functions are sketched in (q, kT) space in Figure 3.2. As 
can be seen, there is the potential for multiple equilibria in fire sale states. In particular, 
if the supply schedule is given by S ", there are three equilibria: R”, U and C. From 
(3.15), S  (0) > 1 for all supply schedules. Therefore, U is unstable but the other two 
equilibria are stable. Point C corresponds to a crisis: intermediaries go into liquidation, 
firms shut down, and all capital is sold to the traditional sector, causing the asset price to 
fall substantially. By contrast, at R/#, fire sales are limited and the asset price only falls 
slightly -  we view this as a ‘recession’ equilibrium since intermediaries remain solvent 
and firms continue to operate in the productive sector.
The actual outcome between R” and C is determined solely by beliefs: if interme­
diaries believe ex ante (before the realisation of the shock) that there will be a systemic 
crisis in states for which there are multiple equilibria, a crisis will indeed ensue in those 
states; if they believe ex ante that there will only be a ‘recession’ in those states, then 
that will be the outcome. Moreover, their ex ante investment and borrowing decisions 
depend on their beliefs. Therefore, multiple equilibria arise ex ante: after beliefs have
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Figure 3.2: Demand and Supply for Capital in the Traditional Sector
been specified (at the start of period 0), investment and borrowing decisions will be 
made contingent on those beliefs and the period 1 equilibrium will be fully determi­
nate, even in states for which there could have been another equilibrium.
However, multiple equilibria and systemic crises are not always possible in fire sale 
states. Specifically, if the supply schedule is given by S', R is the unique equilibrium 
and there can never be a systemic crisis, regardless of beliefs. From (3.15), it is intu­
itively clear that this is more likely to be the case when the negative x shock is relatively 
mild. By contrast, if the shock is extremely severe, a crisis could be inevitable -  supply 
schedule S'" depicts this possibility.
3 .3 .3  T h e  C o m p e t it iv e  E q u il ib r iu m
We now proceed to solve the model for both ‘optimistic’ and ‘pessimistic’ beliefs. 
Suppose that all agents form a common exogenous belief at the start of period 0 about
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what equilibrium will arise when multiple equilibria are possible in period 1: if beliefs 
are ‘optimistic’, agents assume that there will not be a crisis unless it is inevitable (i.e. 
unless the supply schedule resembles S'"); if beliefs are ‘pessimistic’, agents assume 
that if there is a possibility of a crisis, it will indeed happen. Then, as shown in Appen­
dix A, the competitive equilibrium is characterised by the following repayment ratios 
associated with each possible state, x s, where the precise thresholds (x, x  — 6q and x°)  
depend on beliefs and the distribution of shocks:
if x < x s, then bu  = Oqu, (3.18)
if x  — 6q< x s < x, then 6is =  6 q — (x — x s) , (3.19)
if x °  < x s < x — 6q, then bis = 0, (3.20)
if x s < x c , then bis = 6qc  =  max[0 (1 — 2m o), 0]. (3.21)
Expressions (3.18)-(3.20) correspond to similar expressions in Lorenzoni (2005), though 
the actual thresholds differ. However, (3.21) is specific to our model and reflects the 
possibility of systemic financial crises in our setup.
Apart from noting that x <  0 (since intermediaries will never choose to borrow less 
than the maximum against states where the realised x  is positive), relatively little can 
be said about the precise location of the thresholds without specifying how the shock 
is distributed. Section 3.4 determines these thresholds, initial investment, and the state- 
contingent asset price for a specific distribution.
3.3.4 Discussion of the Competitive Equilibrium
Since expected future returns are positive, the competitive equilibrium always ex­
hibits a high level of credit-financed investment in period 0. As summarised in Table 
3.1, subsequent outcomes depend on the realisation of x. In ‘good’ states, x is posi­
tive, investment and credit growth remain strong in period 1, and the economy benefits
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State Realisation of x s Description of Outcome
‘Good’ x s > 0 Intermediaries do not sell any capital. There is 
no production in the traditional sector.
‘Recession’ x c  or x M < x s < 0 Intermediaries sell a portion of their capital but 
remain solvent (i.e. there are only limited fire 
sales). Firms continue to operate in the produc­
tive sector, but with a lower capital stock than in 
‘good’ states. There is some production in the 
traditional sector.
‘Crisis’ x s < x u or x M Intermediaries sell all of their capital and go 
into liquidation. Firms operating in the produc­
tive sector shut down. Production only takes 
place in the traditional sector.
Table 3.1: Summary of Outcomes
from high returns in period 2. Of more interest for our analysis are the ‘recession’ and 
‘crisis’ states in which x  is negative. To further clarify what happens in these cases, 
we sketch the period 1 repayment ratio, b\, and asset price, qi, against x  in Figures 3.3 
and 3.4 respectively. For illustrative purposes, we present the cases o f ‘optimistic’ and 
‘pessimistic’ beliefs on the same diagram, adding an additional threshold, x M, to reflect 
the range of x  for which multiple equilibria are possible.14 However, it is important to 
bear in mind that the thresholds themselves are endogenous to beliefs.
To explain the repayment ratio function in Figure 3.3, consider what happens when 
there is a negative x  shock (for positive x, q\ =  1, implying that b\ = 6). As noted 
above, if the intermediary goes into liquidation as a result of the shock (i.e., if x s < xc  
or x M, depending on beliefs), it does not need to pay the cost x i0. In this case, it 
sells all of its capital at the prevailing market value and repays this ‘scrap value’ to 
consumers. Although it may seem unusual that repayments are positive in ‘crisis’ states 
(and potentially higher than in ‘recession’ states), this is entirely optimal. Intuitively, 
intermediaries have no need for liquidity in ‘crisis’ states because they shut down and
14As for the other thresholds, the location o f  x M  cannot be computed without specifying the distri­
bution o f  the shock. However, Figure 3.2 and the associated discussion clearly illustrate how multiple 
equilibria are only possible over a certain range o f  x .
110
C  i i  * y v ;x  a x - ( J q
A
A- 0
Figure 3.3: The Repayment Ratio as a Function of the Shock
do not pay the cost xio.  By increasing repayments to consumers in these states, they 
are able to increase their period 0 borrowing. Since period 0 investment is expected to 
be profitable, it is, therefore, optimal for intermediaries to promise to repay the entire 
‘scrap value’ of the project to consumers in ‘crisis’ states.
If, however, the intermediary wants to avoid total liquidation following a negative 
shock, it must find a way of financing the cost xio. Given that it always chooses to 
borrow the maximum amount it can between periods 1 and 2, the cost can be financed 
either by reducing repayments to consumers in adverse states or by selling a portion of 
its capital.
The first option reduces expected repayments to consumers (i.e. E  (b\ )), lowering 
the amount that the intermediary can borrow in period 0 (see equation (3.12)) and there­
fore reducing returns in ‘good’ states. The expected cost associated with doing this is 
constant. By contrast, the cost of the second option increases as the asset price falls. 
So, for mild negative shocks in region F of Figure 3.3, it is better to sell capital because 
the asset price remains relatively high. The borrowing / repayment ratio in these states 
remains at its maximum, but this maximum falls slowly as the asset price falls (see
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Figure 3.4: The Asset Price as a Function of the Shock
equations (3.5) and (3.18)).
However, when shocks are more severe and fall in region G, the costs of selling 
capital are so high that it becomes better to reduce repayments to consumers than to sell 
further capital -  this is reflected in (3.19). Eventually, however, the scope for reducing 
repayments is fully exhausted and the only way to finance the cost is to sell further 
capital even though the asset price is relatively low (region H). It is at this point that 
the bis > 0 constraint bites: intermediaries would ideally like to receive payments from 
consumers in these extremely bad states but are prevented from doing so by limited 
commitment on the consumer side.15
Since the asset price, qi, only changes when the amount of capital being sold 
changes, the intuition behind Figure 3.4 follows immediately. For positive x , no capital 
is ever sold, so the asset price remains at one. However, for negative (but non-crisis) 
values of x, the asset price falls over those ranges for which intermediaries finance xio 
by selling additional capital (i.e. for x < x s < 0 and x s < x — Qq). Meanwhile, in 
crises, intermediaries sell all of their capital and the asset price is determined by sub­
15 Since early investment is expected to be profitable, intermediaries have no incentive to set aside 
liquid resources in period 0 to self-insure against extremely bad states in period 1. But even if  some 
self-insurance were optimal, asset sales would still be forced for sufficiently severe shocks.
11 2
stituting (3.16) into (3.17), which gives qc = 1 — 2a i0. If this expression is negative, 
returns to capital in the traditional sector fall to zero before all the available capital is 
being used. In this case, the leftover capital has no productive use in the economy, and
qc = 0.
3.3.5 The Constrained Efficient Equilibrium, Efficiency, and the 
Source of the Externality
We can show that the competitive equilibrium is constrained inefficient by solving 
the problem faced by a social planner who maximises the same objective function as 
intermediaries and is subject to the same constraints, but who does not take prices as 
given. Under certain mild conditions (see Appendix B), the social planner can obtain 
a welfare improving allocation by reducing intermediaries’ borrowing and investment. 
More specifically, the social planner implements a reduction in borrowing against cer­
tain states that has no direct effect on intermediaries’ welfare. But it has a potentially 
important indirect effect: by reducing investment, the amount of capital that has to be 
sold in fire sale states is reduced, and this both reduces the negative effects of asset price 
falls, and lowers the likelihood and severity of crises.
The competitive equilibrium thus exhibits over-borrowing and over-investment rel­
ative to the constrained efficient equilibrium. In particular, if we view the situation with 
no frictions (i.e. without borrowing constraints (3.3)-(3.6)) as corresponding to the 
first-best outcome and the constrained efficient equilibrium as the second-best, then the 
competitive allocation is fourth-best. This is because policy intervention could feasibly 
achieve a third-best outcome even if the second-best allocation cannot be attained.
As noted earlier, the limited commitment and potential default to which financial 
contracts are subject is the key friction in this model. It is straightforward to show 
that the critical constraint is (3.3): if this were relaxed, the competitive equilibrium
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would be efficient and there would never be systemic crises because intermediaries 
would be able to obtain additional payments from consumers in times of severe stress 
(i.e. when x s < x  — 6q) rather than being forced to sell capital. However, when 
coupled with decreasing returns to capital in the traditional sector, the presence of this 
constraint introduces an asset fire sale externality: intermediaries do not internalise the 
negative effects on asset prices that their own fire sales have. By tightening their budget 
constraints further, these asset price falls force other intermediaries to sell more capital 
than they would otherwise have to. In extreme cases, this externality is the source of 
systemic crises.
3.4 Comparative Statics
We now analyse the effects of financial innovation and changes in macroeconomic 
volatility on the likelihood and potential scale of systemic crises. This necessitates 
an assumption about beliefs so that the cut-off value of x  below which crises occur 
is determinate. Accordingly, we suppose that agents have ‘optimistic’ beliefs, so that 
crises only occur when they are inevitable.16
The shock x  is assumed to be normally distributed with mean fi and variance a2, 
where fi > 0. Since analytical solutions for thresholds are unavailable, we present the 
results of numerical simulations. In our baseline analysis, we assume the following 
parameter values: A  =  1.5; n0 =  1; fi = 0.5; a = 0.5; 6 =  0.75; a  =  0.05. We then 
consider the effects of varying a, 6 and a. The empirical relevance of the parameters 
used is discussed in section 3.4.3.17
We measure the likelihood of a crisis by H (x c ) =  Pi[x < x c ] and its scale (impact) 
in terms of the asset price, qc , which prevails in it.18 Lower values of qc  correspond
16A11 o f  our qualitative results continue to hold if  agents have ‘pessim istic’ beliefs.
17The M atlab  code used for the simulations is available on request from the authors. Robustness 
checks were also performed by varying the parameters over a range o f  values.
18Recall that crises are associated with total liquidation. So, although the distribution o f  shocks, H  (x ),
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to more serious crises. To motivate qc  as a measure of the impact of crises, recall that 
in period 0, consumption goods are turned into capital goods one for one. If some 
capital goods end up being used in the less-productive sector to produce consumption 
goods (as happens in a crisis), fewer consumption goods can be produced than were 
used to buy those capital goods initially. Since a lower q corresponds to reduced returns 
on the marginal unit of capital in the traditional sector and hence less production of 
the consumption good from the marginal capital good, the loss associated with a crisis 
increases as qc  falls. Moreover, lower values of qc  correspond to greater asset price 
volatility in the economy, further suggesting that it may be an appropriate measure of 
the scale of systemic instability.
3.4.1 Changes in Macroeconomic Volatility
We interpret a change in macroeconomic volatility as affecting a. Since x  is linked 
to revenue shortfalls and surpluses, it is reasonable to assume that a reduction in output 
and inflation volatility (as is likely to be associated with a general reduction in macro- 
economic volatility) corresponds to a fall in the standard deviation of x.
Intuitively, a reduction in a will lower the probability of crises since extreme states 
become less likely. This is borne out in Figure 3.5(a). However, provided that the mean, 
/i, is sufficiently above zero and the variance is not too large, a lower standard deviation 
also makes ‘recession’ states less likely to occur. As a result, expected repayments to 
consumers, E  (6 1), are higher, meaning that intermediaries can borrow more in period
0. Therefore, initial investment, z0, is higher. But this means that if a crisis then does 
arise, more capital will be sold to the traditional sector, the asset price will be driven 
down further, and the crisis will have a greater impact. This is shown in Figure 3.5(b) 
and can also be seen by considering a rightward shift of S L in Figure 3.2. 19
is continuous, there is only one crisis price, qc , for all x  less than x c .
19If /z is very close to zero and/or a  is very large, it is possible for a reduction in a  to make ‘recession’ 
states more likely. This can potentially lead to a reduction inE(bi) and hence zq, thus reducing the impact
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3.4.2 The Impact of Financial Innovation
We have already argued that financial innovation and recent developments in fi­
nancial markets can be interpreted as implying higher maximum loan-to-value ratios 
(higher values of 6 ) and greater financial market depth (lower values of a). Assum­
ing that the initial value of 0 is not particularly low, Figure 3.6(a) illustrates how these 
changes have made crises less likely (darker areas in the chart correspond to a higher 
crisis frequency). But from Figure 3.6(b), it is apparent that the severity of crises may 
have increased (darker areas correspond to a more severe crisis).
To understand the intuition behind these results, we isolate the individual effects of 
changes in a  and 6 . Figures 3.5(c) and 3.5(d) suggest that a reduction in a  reduces both 
the likelihood and scale of crises. This is intuitive. If the secondary market for capital 
is deeper, shocks can be better absorbed and, in the context of Figure 3.2, the demand
curve in the traditional sector is flatter. As a result, crises are both less likely and less
20severer0
By contrast, Figures 3.5(e) and 3.5(f) suggest that an increase in 6  increases the 
severity of crises and has an ambiguous effect on their probability. This is demonstrated 
more formally in Appendix C. Intuitively, a rise in 6  enables intermediaries to borrow 
more. Therefore, z0 is higher, and crises will be more severe if they occur. Greater bor­
rowing in period 0 clearly serves to increase the probability of crises as well. However, 
a rise in 9 also means that intermediaries have greater access to liquidity in period 1 : 
specifically, they have more scope to reduce period 1 repayments to consumers. This 
effect means that they are less likely to go into total liquidation, making crises less 
likely.
o f  crises. Since the numerical results suggest that this only happens for fairly extreme combinations o f  
the mean and variance, we view the case discussed in the main text as being more likely. However, 
this feature does have the interesting implication that crises could be most severe in fairly stable and 
extremely volatile economies.
20This analysis assumes that secondary markets continue to function with the onset o f  a crisis. How­
ever, a  itself could be endogenous and change during periods o f  stress. So reductions in a  in benign 
times may have little effect on the severity o f  crises.
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Figure 3.5(e) shows that crises are most frequent for intermediate values of 6 , sug­
gesting that middle-income emerging market economies may be most vulnerable to 
systemic instability.21 By contrast, countries with extremely well-developed or very 
underdeveloped financial sectors, with high / low maximum loan-to-value ratios, are 
probably less vulnerable to crises.
3.4.3 Comments on the Quantitative Results
Although our numerical analysis is intended to be illustrative, the baseline case is 
broadly consistent with several features of the data. As would be expected, the leverage 
ratio of assets to equity implied by the model is closely tied to the value of 6 . With 9 set 
to be 0.75, the implied leverage ratio is 3.5, which is reasonably close to the estimate of 
4.9 for average hedge fund leverage over 1996-2004 reported by McGuire et al (2005).
The mean and variance of the shock are chosen in relation to each other and are 
key determinants of the likelihood of ‘recessions’ and crises. If a period is taken as one 
year, the baseline parameter values yield ‘recessions’ once every six and a half years 
and crises once every 200 years. In ‘recession’ states, the average short-run loss which 
intermediaries have to finance is 24% of the initial amount invested; in crises, the rein­
vestment cost needed to continue operations (which intermediaries choose not to pay) is 
almost as much as the initial amount invested. Price falls in adverse states are strongly 
influenced by a  -  in the baseline calibration, the average price discount in ‘recession’ 
states is 17%, while the price falls by 35% in crises. These figures are broadly consis­
tent with the 30% price discount identified by Pulvino (1998) for commercial aircraft 
sales in depressed markets and the 7.9% price discount for fire sale stocks reported by 
Coval and Stafford (2007), especially when we consider that equities are amongst the 
most liquid assets, whilst aircraft are probably amongst the most illiquid assets.
21Aghion et al. (2004) present a similar result but their approach is quite different, focussing on the 
effects o f  fluctuating real exchange rates and international capital flows in a small open economy model.
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3.4.4 Discussion
The comparative static analysis highlights the potential risk of more severe crises 
as a result of financial innovation and greater macroeconomic stability. But this should 
not necessarily be taken to imply that these developments are undesirable. In particular, 
higher values of 6  and lower values of a both imply greater investment in period 0  and, 
as such, may increase welfare.
All of our results were obtained under the assumption that 0 is not state-contingent. 
But ex post changes in 0 in period 1 can affect outcomes. In particular, it is clear from 
(3.15) that when io is strictly greater than k j ,  an unanticipated increase in 6  in period 1 
states with a negative x  will shift the supply curve for capital in the traditional sector to 
the left. As a result, there will be fewer cases in which crises are inevitable. In addition, 
the price fall in ‘recession’ states will be lower. Intuitively, the ex post increase in 6  
enables intermediaries to access more liquidity in period 1 , meaning that they do not 
need to sell as many assets to the traditional sector to continue operations. On the other 
hand, falling maximum loan-to-value ratios during downturns could have detrimental 
effects.
This result suggests that a rule to increase 0 in adverse states may be welfare- 
improving, though a full analysis would clearly require solving the model under the 
assumption that, when making initial investment decisions, intermediaries know that 6  
may be adjusted in period 1. As such, the model illustrates how there may sometimes 
be scope for policymakers to promote liquidity. One specific approach, discussed by 
Borio et al (2001), is the pursuit of discretionary policy towards collateral valuation 
practices during periods of stress. For example, as noted by Borio (2004), supervisory 
authorities in Japan lowered margin requirements and relaxed lending limits on collat­
eral assets in order to alleviate liquidity constraints and contain distress selling during 
the 1987 stock market crash. More generally, the welfare consequences of policies 
that induce market participants to hold liquidity cushions at business-cycle frequencies
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-  building up liquidity during booms and drawing it down during recessions -  merit 
closer investigation.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper analysed a theoretical general equilibrium model of intermediation with 
financial constraints and state-contingent contracts containing a clearly defined pecu­
niary externality associated with asset fire sales during periods of stress. After showing 
that this externality was capable of generating multiple equilibria and systemic finan­
cial crises, we considered the effects of changes in macroeconomic volatility and de­
velopments in financial markets on the likelihood and severity of crises. Together, our 
results suggest how greater macroeconomic stability and financial innovation may have 
reduced the probability of systemic financial crises in developed countries in recent 
years. But these developments could have a dark side: should a crisis occur, its impact 
could be greater than was previously the case.
The paper sheds light on cross-country variation in the likelihood and scale of fi­
nancial crises. Macroeconomic volatility is generally higher in developing countries 
than in advanced economies but maximum loan-to-value ratios are invariably lower. 
Given this, our results predict that crises in emerging market economies should be more 
frequent but less severe than in developed countries. The first of these assertions is 
clearly borne out by the data (Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996, Table 1; Demirguc-Kunt 
and Detragiache, 2005, Table 2). Although the second is more difficult to judge given 
the rarity of financial crises in developed countries in recent years, the length and depth 
of the Japanese financial crisis of the 1990s suggests that such intuition is plausible. 
Moreover, in terms of output losses, Hoggarth et al. (2002) find that crises in developed 
countries do indeed tend to be more costly than those in emerging market economies.
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 The Competitive Equilibrium
In this appendix, we solve the model for the competitive equilibrium when all agents
equilibria are possible. Specifically, they believe that crises only happen when they 
are inevitable and never occur when there are multiple equilibria. If agents have ‘pes­
simistic’ beliefs, the derivation proceeds along very similar lines.
Conditional on beliefs, the equilibrium is unique, and can be fully characterised by 
the three cut-off values for the aggregate shock x  shown in expressions (3.18)-(3.21). 
These cut-offs determine four intervals in the distribution of x  (i.e. in the distribution 
of possible states). In each of these intervals, intermediaries’ incentives to protect their 
net worth, and hence their decisions about optimal repayments, will be different. We 
show how the equilibrium can be fully characterised by these three cut-off points and 
how, conditional on beliefs, it is unique.
Define the subset C as the (endogenous) set of states where there is a crisis. Then 
the return, za, that intermediaries obtain in period 2  in state s from one unit of their net 
worth in state s in period 1 is given by:
To derive this expression, note that in non-crisis states in period 1, a given amount of 
net worth, ni, can be leveraged to obtain a total investment by intermediaries of q\sks = 
ni +  6 ks. In other words, each unit of net worth is leveraged by a factor of 1/ (qu  — 0). 
Since the return per unit of capital after payment of liabilities is A  — 0 (recall that 
&2s =  #), return per unit of net worth in non-crisis states is therefore (A — 0) /  (q\s — 6 ). 
By contrast, in crisis states, intermediaries do not invest, so the marginal return to net
have ‘optimistic’ beliefs about what equilibrium will arise in states in which multiple
(3.22)
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worth is just its consumption value of one.
Meanwhile, the return, zq, that intermediaries obtain in period 2 by investing one 
unit of their net worth in period 0  is given by:
20 = E« c [zT ^ k \  Pr[s * 61 + [iTbm] Pr[s e ^  (3'23)
This is the expected value of the product of period 1 and period 2 returns. The period 1 
return may be explained along similar lines to the period 2 return. The factor by which 
intermediaries leverage one unit of period 0 net worth to purchase capital is 1 — E  (bi). 
In non-crisis states, the return per unit of capital is x s +  q\s — bis. However, since 
intermediaries that fully liquidate do not pay the cost x sio, the return per unit of capital 
in crisis states is q\s — bis.
States can be divided into four sets: Si = {s : 1 < < z0}, S 2 = {s : zs = z0},
Ss = {s : zs > 20}, and C =  {s : =  1 < z0}-We want to show that these sets cover
the whole distribution of x, with Si covering states from +oo to x(< 0), S 2 from x  to 
x  — 6 q, S 3 from x — 6 q to x c , and C from x c  to —0 0 .
Consider a state s that belongs to Si. We want to show that if x s> > x s, then 
s' G Si. In state s G Si, borrowing will be at its maximum possible level in period 0 
(Pis = Qqis) because zo > z8, and the price of capital will satisfy qis = F f[max(kJ, 0)]. 
If x s> > x s > 0, then there are no fire sales and qis =  qist =  1, and zs = zs>. If 
0 > x s> > x s, then kj, < k j ,  qu  < qu > and zat < zs. In both cases, z3> < z0 and hence 
s' belongs to Si.
The threshold for x  that separates Si and S 2 is x. It is the value for which, in 
equilibrium, zo = zs and there is maximum borrowing (gls =  q is the equilibrium price 
in that state). For all states in S 2 = {s : =  z0}, qis has to be constant, and given
that zo is constant in all states in S 2, the amount borrowed in each state is pinned down
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and given by bis = 9q — (x — x s). The second cut-off, x — 9q, is the value of x  for 
which bis = 0 and zs = z0. As x  decreases beyond x — 9q, the repayment / borrowing 
ratio cannot be reduced any further. Therefore, more capital is sold in the secondary 
market, implying that q\s < q  and hence zs > zq. Following the same logic as when we 
show that all values above x  belong to Si, it is straightforward to show that all values 
below x — 9q but above the crisis threshold, x c , belong to S3 . (It is important to note at 
this point that we are assuming that whenever it is possible to have multiple equilibria, 
‘optimistic’ self-fulfilling beliefs imply that the ‘recession’ equilibrium arises rather 
than the ‘crisis’ equilibrium. We do not specify the precise set of multiple equilibria 
states, as this set is itself endogenous and a function of beliefs.)
To complete the characterisation, we need to show that there is a threshold, x c , 
below which crises are unavoidable, and find conditions under which this threshold 
is lower than x — 9q. The solution for x c  is obtained by solving the system of two 
equations that results from equating the demand and supply curves and their slopes. It 
is given by:
r ( i - 0)2 +6l ] ( 3 2 4 )
x c  =  -
8mo
An exact analytical condition for x c  to be lower than x — 9q requires an assumption 
about the distribution of x. In our numerical exercises we check that this condition is 
satisfied, finding that it is for most parameter values.
3.A.2 The Social Planner’s Solution
The social planner’s optimisation problem is given by:
max E 0 (ni +  7r2) =  max Es(±c
i o , { k s } , { h s }  io,{A;s},{6is}
' A - 9 
_q — 9
(x + q -  bi)i0 Pr[s g C]
+E s€c [(<? -  61) io] Pr[s G C]
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subject to:
«o =  +  E  (61) i 0 -  T,  (3.25)
kjqis = — (xs — bis) io ~  (^0 — 6  Vs: partial or no liquidation (s ^ C), (3.26)
0 < b l s < Oqis Vs, (3.27)
and:
E  [3e +  r  +  F{kT) -  qkT -  w] > UCE, (3.28)
where C is the set of crisis states, UCE is the utility of consumers under the competitive 
equilibrium, r  is a transfer from intermediaries to consumers, F  (kT) — qkT represents 
profits to consumers from production in the traditional sector, w =  —Xx is the cost of a 
financial crisis to consumers, and 0 < A < 1 .
Condition (3.28) requires that consumers are at least as well off in the constrained 
efficient equilibrium as in the competitive equilibrium. To satisfy this condition, the so­
cial planner implements any necessary transfer, r ,  from intermediaries to consumers in 
period 0. The key difference between the social planner and representative intermediary 
problems is that the social planner does not take the asset price, qu, as given.
Since qis = F' (fcj) and since kT = io in crisis states, the social planner’s problem 
can be rewritten as:
max E 0 (ni +  7r2)
=  E s tc  W f c r ) - g  [x +  F ’ {kT)  -  h ]  io}  P r[s  i  c ]
+ E 3eC{[F, (i0 ) - b 1]i0 } P i [ s e C }
subject to:
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io = n0 + E i b ^ i o - r ,  (3.29)
k j F '  (/cj) =  — (xa — bis) io ~  (^ o — k j )  9 Vs: partial or no liquidation (s ^  C),
(3.30)
0 < ha < OF' (k j )  Vs, (3.31)
and:
E  [3e +  r  +  F  (kT) -  F'  (kT) kT - w } >  UCE. (3.32)
To show that the competitive allocation is not constrained efficient, it is sufficient to 
show that the social planner can increase welfare by decreasing borrowing and invest­
ment in period 0. Such a change has several effects:
1. It reduces welfare by lowering the level of ex ante investment, i0.
2. It increases welfare by reducing liabilities, bis, in certain states.
3. It reduces the amount of capital that has to be sold in fire sale states, increasing 
the asset price in those states.
4. It reduces the likelihood of a crisis.
We wish to determine when the net effect on welfare is positive. The positive con­
tributions to welfare arise directly from the lower level of asset sales in fire sale states, 
and indirectly from a decrease in the likelihood of a crisis. We derive a condition under 
which the direct mechanism alone gives a positive net effect. Considering the indirect 
effect would strengthen our results but the analysis depends on the specific distributional 
assumptions taken and there is generally no closed-form solution.
Starting from the competitive allocation, suppose the social planner reduces ex ante 
investment by Aio and reduces borrowing by the same amount against states in which
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z0 = zs (z0 and zs are ex ante and ex post returns, as defined in Appendix A). First note 
that reducing borrowing against these states has no negative welfare effect on intermedi­
aries since they are indifferent between investing ex post in them and ex ante in general. 
Therefore, to determine whether the reduction in z0 is welfare-improving, we simply 
need to consider whether the welfare cost to consumers can be fully compensated for 
by any gain to intermediaries.
Differentiating the market clearing condition for used capital (which is obtained 
by equating supply, (3.15), and demand (3.17)), we can see that the reduction in z0 
decreases the amount of capital sold in ‘recession’ states by:
d k j  = x s + d -  bu n  w
di0 [Ff {kT) -  9\ +  F"  (kT) kT' K }
The profit consumers obtain from operating their technology is F  (kT) — F' (kT) kT. 
Therefore, in ‘recession’ states, the reduction in zo has a direct welfare cost to consumers 
of:
d [F (kT) -  F> (kT) kT] d k j  x 3 + e -  bu , T, T
d k j  di0 [F'{kT) ~ 9 }  + F"{kT) k T V ; '
(3.34)
Intuitively, ps represents the amount of goods transferred in ‘recession’ states from con­
sumers to intermediaries as a result of the social planner’s implementation of an equi­
librium with lower borrowing than the competitive equilibrium. Intermediaries have to 
transfer at least this amount to consumers (in period 0, when they have resources to do 
so) to compensate them for this loss. What needs to be shown is that the net effect of 
this transfer is positive for intermediaries.
This will be the case if:
E ( p ) z o < E ( p z ) .  (3.35)
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The left hand side of (3.35) is the cost of the transfer to intermediaries and the right 
hand side is the benefit. In period 0, intermediaries transfer E  (p) goods to consumers, 
which they could have invested at a return zq. On the other hand, intermediaries now 
have extra resources of ps in each ‘recession’ state in period 1. Since returns on ad­
ditional capital in period 1 are z8, the expected benefit from these extra resources is 
E  (pz) .Without specifying the distribution of x  and the parameter values, we cannot be 
specific about when this inequality is satisfied. However, provided that the distribution 
of x  has sufficient variance, so that states in which zs > zq are not very isolated events, 
it is generally satisfied (note that the positive correlation between p and z helps in this 
regard). If this is the case, welfare is unambiguously higher under the social planner’s 
allocation than under the competitive equilibrium.
3.A.3 Implications of Changes in the Maximum Loan-to-Value Ra­
tio
In this appendix, we show that increases in the maximum loan-to-value ratio, 0, 
heighten the scale of crises but have an ambiguous effect on their probability. Recall 
that we measure the likelihood of a crisis by H (xc ) = Pr[x < x c ] and its scale in 
terms of the asset price, qc , which prevails in it.
We start by analysing the scale of crises. Substituting (3.16) into (3.17) gives the 
asset price in crises:
qc = 1 — 2mo- (3.36)
In general, if 0 increases, intermediaries can borrow more against those states in which 
they are constrained, which serves to increase their initial investment, io. There are 
only two channels through which intermediaries’ investment could be reduced by an 
increase in 6 . First, there is a general equilibrium channel by which an increase in 6  
may decrease the price of second hand capital in certain states, thus reducing the value
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of collateral in those states and, hence, reducing borrowing against those states. But this 
can only happen if, overall, initial investment has increased as a result of the increase 
in 0 -  as such, it can only ever be an offsetting channel. Second, an increase in 0 
may lower the likelihood of crises, which could reduce ex ante borrowing given that 
borrowing is positive against crisis states but may be zero against certain ‘recession’ 
states (see Figure 3). However, this effect has very little significance since crisis states 
are much rarer than states in which intermediaries are constrained. Given this, it follows 
that initial investment, z0, is a positive function of 0. From (3.36), this implies that crises 
become more severe as the maximum loan-to-value ratio rises.
In terms of the probability of crisis, first note that from (3.24), the crisis threshold 
below which crises are unavoidable is given by:
x c = - 8aio
(3.37)
Differentiating with respect to 6 gives:
dxc  =  dx^_ ^  dxc  dip
dO d9 di0 09 { ’ }
1 — 9
4mo
-  1 ( 1 - 1 9 ) ' fto
8mn d9
When 9 = 1, this expression is negative, implying that the crisis threshold is falling 
and crises becoming less likely as 9 increases. So, in the vicinity of 9 = 1, it must be the 
case that increases in the maximum loan-to-value ratio reduce the probability of crises. 
The case where 9 = 0 is less clear cut as the sign of the first term in (3.24) is ambiguous. 
But, when 0 =  0, initial investment by intermediaries, z0, is restricted to their initial net 
worth, n0. Therefore, if initial net worth is sufficiently small, the first term in (3.39) is 
positive when 0 =  0, as is the whole expression, implying that the likelihood of crises 
is increasing in 0. So, increases in 0 have an ambiguous effect on the probability of
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crises, serving to reduce their probability for high values of 9 but generally increasing 
their probability for low values of 9.
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